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And insofar as men “cannot live by bread alone,” they are moved by doctrine, which
is to say, they derive purposes from language, which tells them what they “ought” to
want to do, tells them how to do it, and in the telling goads them with great threats and
promises, even unto the gates of heaven and hell.
--Kenneth Burke, “Epilogue: Prologue in Heaven”
The Rhetoric of Religion

INTRODUCTION

Although Kenneth Burke was a literary and rhetorical theorist while Kurt
Vonnegut was primarily a fiction author, their respective bodies of work intersect
historically, thematically, and philosophically in ways that can contribute to scholars’
understanding of both of their careers when explored alongside one another. Largely,
both writers seem to share a perspective on the war, economics, and religion in midtwentieth century America despite having taken alternative routes in pursuit of those
topics. Born into the same long period of socio-cultural and political conflict at home and
abroad (despite Burke’s roughly twenty-five-year senior over Vonnegut), these writers
were naturally facing the same public issues that would come to define that period in U.S.
history. However, to say simply that these men lived through the same historical period
fails to qualify the substance of the similarities that can be found in their perspectives on
that period. Ultimately, what can be found in the works of these thinkers is a shared
philosophically pragmatic perspective on how to manage the conflicts that their world
was facing—a pragmatism embodied in the pentad as a tool but also in Burke and
Vonnegut’s own shared emphasis on human agency that can and should be utilized.
Though their bodies of work are expansive, each contains a “trilogy” or series that
is central to those respective bodies of work. Burke’s rhetorical series includes A
Grammar of Motives (1945), A Rhetoric of Motives (1950), and The Rhetoric of Religion
(1961). Although, A Symbolic of Motives was his intended third installment. Vonnegut’s
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series, sometimes referred to as the Rosewater Trilogy, includes God Bless You, Mr.
Rosewater (1965), Slaughterhouse-Five (1969), and Breakfast of Champions (1973).
Though Vonnegut’s Rosewater Trilogy comes a number of years later than Burke’s
amidst the Civil Rights movement and opposition to the war in Vietnam, both series’
respond to the period including and following World War II in converging ways. What’s
important here is not just that Burke and Vonnegut were responding to issues of and
relating all the way back to WWII but that, even as Vonnegut was also responding to the
civic and war-related conflicts of the sixties, the theories of Burke’s rhetorical trilogy
remained relevant to the social instability that was occurring years later when Vonnegut
was writing. A simple explanation for Burke’s continued relevancy is that Burke wrote
Dramatism as a method for uncovering the intersections between and among competing
ideologies or belief systems in order to transcend seemingly irreconcilable differences;
and, Vonnegut, as a satirist, was interested at the very least in uncovering inconsistencies
in the logic of the various belief systems of Americans. In this sense, the two complement
one another by virtue of their shared interest in the way that humans rationalize and
privilege particular aspects of their belief systems depending upon the circumstances in
which they find themselves.
For Burke, Dramatism’s pentad provides a framework for understanding which
pentadic element is privileged and what that means about how the person (or agent) sees
him or herself within any given symbolic act. In A Grammar of Motives, Burke refers to
this privileging as the “featuring of a term” within a philosophic terminology (128). The
entire “grammar” of motives is based around five propositions about each element of the
pentad of which Burke writes:
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For the featuring of scene, the corresponding philosophic terminology is
materialism.
For the featuring of agent, the corresponding terminology is idealism.
For the featuring of agency, the corresponding terminology is pragmatism.
For the featuring of purpose, the corresponding terminology is mysticism.
For the featuring of act, the corresponding terminology is realism. (128)
The hallmark of Dramatistic analysis is that none of these elements operates
independently of the others, which is why ambiguities must arise. For instance, any
terminology that privileges or features the agent in the explanation of an action will
necessarily still involve the identification of scene, act, agency, and purpose, so these
philosophic terminologies that are inherently contrary to one another also depend upon
one another in other ways. Dramatism can accommodate a variety of analytical needs, but
one of Burke’s priorities lay with the necessity of dialectical thinking for the possibility
of overcoming conflict generated by competing ideologies or belief systems.
This purpose for Dramatism—as a tool for understanding and overcoming human
conflict—embodies a pragmatic spirit. As David L. Hildebrand writes, “Burke and
pragmatists make practical action their philosophical starting point”, and “‘pragmatism’
could easily be substituted for ‘dramatistic’” (641). Though the history of pragmatism in
philosophy and theory may be complex, Burke is certainly a pragmatist in his own sense
of the term as it stands in the Dramatistic pentad. Hildebrand goes on to describe ways in
which Burke at points in his career appears to diverge from pragmatic impulses citing
pragmatism’s resistance to notions of essentialism or grand narratives (646; 651);
however, Burke consistently remains the theorist who, when his claims could most begin
to appear essentialist, reminds his reader that “it’s more complicated than that.”
Importantly, David Blakesley reminds Burke scholars that “the scene of pragmatism is
language” (80). Blakesley goes on to state: “The purpose of pragmatism, to create the
3

possibilities for and extend the ongoing philosophical conversation, is realized through
agency” (80). In his own terminology, Burke’s pragmatism features agency in both
agency-purpose and agency-scene ratios (80). Understanding his work in this way may
begin to account for what many scholars see as a turn in Burke’s thinking as he moves
from his Grammar and Rhetoric to logology.
Burke’s enthusiasm for the necessity of dialectical thinking is evident throughout
his writings on Dramatism, but, because he was writing fiction, Vonnegut lacks the
avenue for making this directly evident in the way that Burke could. Even so, based on
his attention to criticizing essentialist ways of thinking through his fiction, Vonnegut can
still be conceived of as a writer who valued dialectical thinking, which is particularly
evident in his critiques of war. In fact, Burke and Vonnegut shared in an attitude of
opposition to war. Historically, that attitude begins with World War II for both writers
and certainly extends into the period of the Vietnam War for Vonnegut. Billy Pilgrim in
Slaughterhouse-Five, which was published in the midst of the Vietnam conflict, stands as
Vonnegut’s unquestionable critique of the senselessness of war both in the act of it and in
the state that it left those who survived it.
Similarly, Elizabeth Weiser has noted that the Grammar’s epigraph—ad bellum
purificandum—holds important implications for understanding how WWII impacted
Burke’s intellectual development (286). Because Burke understood that war suppresses
the impulse for dialectical thinking, Weiser argues, he wrote the Grammar as a “specific
response to the real threat of totalitarianism, both militarily from Nazi Germany and
politically from the U.S. response to that militarism” (290; 287). Militarism assumes that
violent defenses of the “way of life” of the nation are not only necessary but desirable in
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the face of threats to that way of life from the enemy. For Burke, the transcendence that
Dramatism and dialectical thinking could allow were desirable ahead of resorting to war.
For Vonnegut, first-hand experience from his service in WWII left him aware of the
capacity for war to render those involved simply unable to process. Both saw that war
could suspend active thought.
Not only do Burke and Vonnegut share this general sense of war’s destructive
effect on individuals, but they seem to share a resistance to the alliance of capitalism and
Christianity that solidified during the early to mid-twentieth century. As much as Burke
saw war as a suppressor of the dialectic, conceptions of the free-market as a divine
economic system also suppressed the dialectic. Because mystic orders can deem certain
objects or beliefs divine, the possibility for questioning that divinity is resisted. While the
mysticism of that alliance could obscure the possibility for dialectical thinking, Vonnegut
saw the alliance as inherently contradictory. This is evidenced by his Tralfamadorianism,
which parodies Christian religious beliefs, and his critiques of capitalism embodied by
Eliot Rosewater. As historian Kevin Kruse points out, many Americans today believe that
the United States is a nation founded upon faith in God; however, even as some historians
have identified the Eisenhower administration as the beginning of this trend, even more
are unaware that its roots reach as far back as the 1930s (xiii-xvi). Kruse explains that
“Christian libertarianism” arose out of a response to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal
where “corporate titans enlisted conservative clergymen to promote new political
arguments” aimed at the notion of free enterprise (xiv). In the Spring of 1935, Rev. James
W. Fifield began his movement of Spiritual Mobilization, which was a crusade to
undermine the New Deal upon the assertion that Roosevelt’s policies were totalitarian
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and a threat to the freedoms of all Americans, not just the wealthy (Kruse 11-12). Though
Fifield would sell his evangelical movement to Americans on these more essentialist
terms, Burke and Vonnegut were skeptical of essentialist worldviews, as the dialectic
would require. For this reason, Vonnegut’s most satirical characters lay claim to the most
essentialist worldviews and, ironically, resemble Fifield and others like him for this
reason. Fifield’s movement, in part, allowed Christianity to validate the political and
economic values of capitalism. Burke and Vonnegut come to share the perspective that
theology is predicated upon human agency, a notion that the alliance between free-market
capitalism and Christianity must deny if materialist philosophies privilege scene rather
than agency within the Dramatistic framework.
This alliance between economic and theological systems easily becomes
pervasive and does, at least for Vonnegut, also begin to implicate American war efforts.
While historians disagree about exact dates, the Cold War began shortly after the end of
WWII. In the same year that Burke published his Rhetoric (1950), what would quickly
come to be known as McCarthyism began as individuals who were proven or suspected
of sympathizing with communist ideals were unconstitutionally fired from jobs, arrested,
and even jailed (Schrecker 1047, 1059). This second Red Scare lasted until roughly 1956,
a period in which Ellen Schrecker explains that anyone who held communist ideals was
automatically presumed a traitor (1052). Here again, McCarthyism was the embodiment
of a movement that denied the dialectical thinking which Burke so prized. Fear of
communism as a threat to American freedoms halted the possibility of transcending
seeming differences and inflamed public support for the unjust accusations and treatment
of those who did so little as to support race equality. These same themes appear in
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Vonnegut’s Rosewater Trilogy as Eliot is suspected of being a communist by his own
father. As Schrecker explains, “Because the Communist Party had been strongly
committed to racial equality, many loyalty investigators believed that party members
could be identified by their support for civil rights and participation in interracial
activities” (1067). Although brief in comparison to others, critiques of race inequality
also appear in Vonnegut’s works in which he explicitly links such inequality to
justification made through belief in God. In Vonnegut’s fiction, the relationships between
war, capitalism, and Christianity as well as social justice become difficult to separate
because the underlying matter of human agency implicates each of them similarly.
Burke’s logology, theorized in The Rhetoric of Religion, is significant in relation
to this historical period because of the scapegoating pattern it describes as inherent in
Christian theology. Although Kristy Maddux proposes a revision to logology which I
later argue is unnecessary, she makes the important point that “the danger in atonement
theology is that it sanctions violence done by humans as part of God’s heavenly plan,”
which is precisely the kind of danger that emerges from the alliance between capitalism
and Christianity that Vonnegut so heavily criticizes (217). Burke’s rhetorical series
offered his society an alternative way to face conflict through the necessity of the
dialectic in a way that would lead to dialectical-rhetorical transcendence, and Vonnegut
held a mirror up to American society as a way of forcing readers to come face-to-face
with the most philosophically and ideologically problematic aspects of their culture.
As chaotic as the mid-twentieth century likely felt for those who lived through it,
it’s no great wonder that Burke and Vonnegut’s works at times remain somewhat
enigmatic as scholars continue to debate over their ideas. In many ways, it seems, both

7

men set out writing with a clear picture of where their ideas would take them yet
remained in a constant state of needing to revise and clarify, always building and
meditating upon what was already on the page. Burke himself explains in the introduction
to A Grammar of Motives that originally he had “no notion of writing a ‘Grammar’ at all”
(xvii). Upon distinguishing “the makings of a Grammar,” he writes, “we found in the
course of writing that our project needed a grounding …” (xviii). As such, the Grammar
and its counterparts (the Rhetoric and the Symbolic) began somewhat without
anticipation, and Burke adds that “the three fields overlap considerably” (xviii). Although
I am unaware of Vonnegut making similar observations of his own work, it seems not
unreasonable to read his works as if they too overlap considerably. For, as Kathryn Hume
suggests, “One must examine the mutations through which Vonnegut’s kaleidoscopic
cosmos passes, for […] they provide the terms for him to express some of his basic
philosophical beliefs […] for all his works form parts of a single tapestry” (209). Because
Burke and Vonnegut appear to work in this way, I have found reading them for the light
that their later works can shed on earlier works to be most productive.
Fundamentally, Burke and Vonnegut offer pragmatic perspectives on these public
issues, or as Burke would put it, they feature human agency as the pentadic element in
their view of how these conflicts could and perhaps should be approached. Though later
Burke’s theorization of logology verges on mystification, he still maintains his
understanding of the dialectic as somewhat necessarily unresolvable. In chapter I, I take
up the peculiar fact that Dramatism, although written with literature as its main subject
for analysis, has been almost completely uninfluential in literary studies. Fredric Jameson
offers several critiques of Dramatism that explain, at least in part, why the method has
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not been found useful or productive by literary scholars. Because Dramatism retains
value for its usefulness in understanding ideologies, I argue both for a reconciliation of
logology to the Dramatistic framework at large and a reclamation of Dramatistic analysis
for literature.
In chapter II, I illustrate how Burke and Vonnegut shared a perspective on
language as symbolic action through logology by reading the Rosewater Trilogy
alongside the “Epilogue: Prologue in Heaven” of The Rhetoric of Religion. Both writers
posit the certainty of human agency based on Biblical theology, which becomes
significant to Vonnegut’s critique of Christianity in particular but also its relationship to
war, capitalism, and social justice in general. I dramatistically analyze the Tralfamadorian
philosophy that Billy Pilgrim lives by as well as Kilgore Trout’s conception of himself as
an agent in the world in order to show that the denial of agency in an agency-purpose
ratio privileges purpose as an explanation for the actions of these characters’ lives.
In chapter III, I expound upon this fundamental dialectical ratio of purpose and
agency identified in chapter II in order to show how reading the later two installments of
the Rosewater Trilogy back on God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater are pivotal to
understanding Eliot’s character. By understanding Vonnegut’s critique of the problematic
alliance between capitalism and Christianity, a Dramatistic analysis of Eliot reveals him
to be purely contrary to those worldviews evidenced by his idealistic humanism.
Ultimately, the pure idealism of Eliot’s “Gospel-inspired socialism”, as Brian
McCammack has called it, does not quite attain the transcendence which Dramatism
itself can allow. Eliot dismisses the significance of the agency-purpose ratio by placing
all of his focus on the agent alone in his quest for social equality. His pure idealism, in
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Burkeian terms, suppresses the dialectic as much as Billy’s Tralfamadorianism or
Sylvia’s Samaritrophia.
By approaching Vonnegut’s Rosewater Trilogy through the lens of Burke’s
theories of Dramatism and the rhetorical series as a whole, it becomes possible to better
understand the fundamental dialectical problem of free-will present in the blending of
economic and religious belief systems that Vonnegut took issue with. Thomas Marvin
explains in a discussion of God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater that “as Marx pointed out,
capitalism allies itself with Christianity in order to convince workers that an unjust
system is actually God’s will” (cited in McCammack 173). This alliance between
economics and theology coupled with the effects of war stripped away some propensity
for Burke and Vonnegut’s Americans to see themselves having agency. As mentioned, it
ultimately seems as if Eliot’s humanism falls short of achieving Burke’s ideal conception
of transcendence—a not so surprising circumstance considering that Eliot is equally
subject to critique as Vonnegut’s other characters. For Burke and Vonnegut, however, the
core issues lie not only with these particular ideologies but with the suppression of the
dialectic altogether. In the spirit of their shared pragmatism, it’s clear that, for both
writers, the future was at stake, and they seem to converge in what Robert Morace calls
Vonnegut’s “career-long critique of America” that “addresses faults that lay far deeper in
the American subconscious itself” (152).
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CHAPTER I

THE LIMITS OF DRAMATISM RECONSIDERED

In the 2010 edition of The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, among the
list of the anthology's thinkers on rhetoric are Aristotle, Augustine, Paul de Man, Jacques
Lacan, and Hayden White just to name a few (xxx). Curiously, the anthology’s list
neglects the likes of Kenneth Burke. In the Subject Index of the anthology, Burke is listed
only as he relates to Cleanth Brooks, Fredric Jameson, and de Man (2707). While this
may seem a triviality, it is telling that a publisher as reputable as Norton in literary
studies would neglect to include the theorist who published arguably more on rhetoric as
it relates to literature in the 20th century than any of his contemporaries. Burke has
maintained a hold in several fields including sociology, communication studies, and
linguistics; yet, he has been largely unthought-of in literary studies despite the fact that
his Dramatism was originally written with literary analysis in mind. This peculiarity calls
for a reconsideration of Burke in regards to literary study for, as Fredric Jameson points
out, “lip service is customarily extended in passing” to Burke’s work, which has been
“virtually read by everybody” (“The Symbolic” 508).
Because Burke has been so widely read, it comes as no surprise that many
scholars in literary studies and otherwise have been frustrated by the fact that he never
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completed his rhetorical series in the sense that he originally promised. While Burke’s
writings on Dramatism and its associated concepts appear in a variety of autonomous
essays across a number of years, he published collections of essays in book format for
what he conceptualized as a rhetorical series that would include A Grammar of Motives,
A Rhetoric of Motives, and A Symbolic of Motives. His many writings might be thought of
as “workings-through” of his theory of language as symbolic action with the book
compilations coming together to more fully assert his theoretical stance. After the
publication of the Grammar in 1945 and the Rhetoric in 1950, the Symbolic never came
(at least not officially from Burke) and his next book-length theoretical publication
appeared as The Rhetoric of Religion in 1961.
Generally, the Grammar offers Burke’s conception of the dramatistic pentad and
how it can be used to understand how agents talk about motive as human dramas play
out. The Rhetoric then introduces the concept of identification with the goal of
consubstantiation and offers a new understanding of rhetoric as persuasion through
identification. Finally, for which Burke has been criticized, The Rhetoric of Religion
appears to diverge from his original project by focusing on what he had been theorizing
as logology rather than on culminating the symbolic aspect of Dramatism. In light of this
criticism, I first argue that The Rhetoric of Religion does fulfill a symbolic aspect of the
series because logology deals with the dialectical quality of language, or as Burke says,
“the nature of language itself as a motive” (vi). In addition, logology provides a basis for
thinking about how language constitutes the need for dramatistic analysis such that
logology theoretically precedes dramatism because the dialectical quality of language
instigates the symbolic action that dramatism is structured to analyze.
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With this interpretation in mind, I take into consideration the criticisms of Fredric
Jameson who provides a substantial and authoritative explanation for Burke’s lack of
influence in literary studies. Based on what he identifies as “a wider latitude for the
exercise of personal themes and the free play of private idiosyncrasies,” Jameson
emphasizes a weakness between Burke’s theories of symbolic action as they relate to
both ideological and historical influence on human dramas and a weakness stemming
from the subordinated status of Purpose in the dramatistic pentad (“The Symbolic” 508).
While I agree in part with Jameson’s criticisms, I offer a perspective that shows how
Dramatism is still a practical framework for literary critics interested in understanding the
influence that ideologies have in human dramas and in understanding how seemingly
conflicting ideologies can arise from within a single character, text, or author.
In what follows, I first address The Rhetoric of Religion’s status as the symbolic
counterpart of the rhetorical series and lay the groundwork for the basic tenets of
dramatism. I then trace Burke’s thinking through logology and how its dialectic relates to
both the Dramatistic pentad and rhetoric’s identification in order to show how, as I have
claimed, logology is the theoretical basis of Dramatism because of its focus on dialectic
terms. With the help of Robert Wess’ Kenneth Burke: Rhetoric, Subjectivity, and
Postmodernism, I explore in detail the conflict over the dialectic that occurs in The
Rhetoric of Religion to show that Burke himself was unable to neatly rectify his reliance
upon the order-disorder pair in theorizing logology. By understanding the conflict Burke
faced, it becomes easier to see that logology still maintains a crucial theoretical
understanding of language’s ability to create material conflict and that logology is better
understood as describing what Burke had observed in the world rather than asserting an
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unalterable historical narrative. I then put Jameson’s criticisms in conversation with the
texts of the Grammar and Rhetoric as well as Burke’s direct responses to him in order to
walk through the parts of a Dramatistic analysis—the pentad, its ratios and ambiguities,
circumference, identification, and transcendence—to suggest how Dramatism is still
relevant and practical when critics understand its history and how it can accommodate
new rhetorical scenarios. By taking the opportunity to understand logology for both its
narrower and more general senses in regard to dialectical terms, logology can still be
productive for literary scholars who are interested in thinking about the relationship
between language and action as it implicates ideology within literary texts. In doing so, I
suggest that dramatism has the potential to live up to conventional expectations for
literary analysis in spite of its marginalization in that discipline.
Logology as the Symbolic
Although it does not necessarily fulfill the expectations originally established for
A Symbolic of Motives, The Rhetoric of Religion does fulfill a symbolic aspect of the
rhetorical series. According to Burke, if theology is “words about God”, then logology is
“words about words”, and statements about the nature of God can be adapted “for use as
purely secular observations on the nature of words” (The Rhetoric 1). Burke’s purpose
was “to ask how theological principles can be shown to have useable secular analogues
that throw light upon the nature of language” (2). Simply put, Burke was interested in
how language itself influences human conflict.
Logology theorizes the conflict created by language in its purely symbolic nature,
and it provides the theoretical groundwork for understanding how dramatistic analysis
becomes necessary at all. In the most basic sense, logology is a theory of language that
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explains how a purely symbolic entity can create what we perceive as tangible effects on
the world. Burke elaborates upon the idea through theology, but, fundamentally, his point
revolves around language itself as the root of motive. Language allows humans to create
structure via order and hierarchy in their social, cultural, political, and historical world.
At the same time, the dialecticism of language causes tension in human usage of
language that ultimately creates drama when humans find themselves on seemingly
irreconcilable opposing sides of a given idea. Because language in its symbolic nature
allows humans to imagine ideas that maintain no direct biologic counterpart, the
nonsymbolic or biological undoubtedly falls short of the symbolic. Language allows the
biological human to imagine “perfection” and the entelechial drive to achieve that
perfection spurs the human to work for something that exists symbolically rather than
materially—a drive that is bound to fail.
Logology theorizes both this falling short of symbolic perfection and the tension
that is created by terms that are in dialectical opposition. While some dialectical pairs are
purely symbolic, any symbolic term which finds its dialectical opposite in nature pulls the
nonsymbolic within the realm of logology. The ability of the symbolic to induce an effect
on the nonsymbolic exemplifies language as symbolic action. Without language, there is
only biological motion. With language as the symbolic, humans become able to act and
speculate about the motives, or the whys, associated with those actions. As Burke
explains, the realms of nonsymbolic motion and symbolic action can neither “be
complete without the other, nor can they be identical” (“(Nonsymbolic) Motion” 821).
Language as symbolic action depends upon language itself as a motive because, as Burke
says, any movement induced by the biological is not action but motion. In this sense,
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then, logology explains how language itself influences human behavior making it a
theoretical precursor to the grammar of the pentad and the rhetoric and identification. The
cyclical nature of Burke’s work has been a contentious topic for scholars; however, in
this case, that cyclical nature allows for thinking of logology as a theoretical concept
from which the grammatical and rhetorical framework can later be applied to language as
symbolic action.
Because dramatism needs to analyze the language used to explain an action, the
substance of literature as language that conveys a story, or a series of actions, makes it
ideal for this kind of analysis. Michael A. Overington points out that “the essential facts
in a literary work are its words; thus, the basic tool for analysis is a selected concordance
of terms” (145). While there would likely be little dispute over Overington’s claim, it is a
significant point to recognize now because literary criticism involves analyzing language
to draw conclusions about literary dramas.
For Dramatism, the purpose of analyzing literature involves answering the
pentadic questions as critics seek to produce arguments about what may or may not be
driving or motivating the drama and its characters (or agents). In the introduction to A
Grammar of Motives, Burke defines Dramatism based on the parameters of its five key
terms (the pentad): Act, Scene, Agent (to which Attitude is later added), Agency,
Purpose. Burke poses the question: “What is involved, when we say what people are
doing and why they are doing it?” (xv). He goes on to state that any “rounded” or
“complete statement about motives will offer some kind of answers to these five
questions: what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent),
how he did it (agency), and why (purpose)” (xv). The elements of the pentad themselves
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make up the grammar, as Burke writes: “Strictly speaking, we mean by a Grammar of
motives a concern with terms alone, without reference to the ways in which their
potentialities have been or can be utilized in actual statements about motives” (xvi). The
actual statements about motive involve the rhetorical aspect of dramatism, which is
identification. A Rhetoric of Motives offers a philosophy of rhetoric that takes the
traditional sense of rhetoric as persuasion and adds identification (xiv). On one hand,
identifying terms create consubstantiation which is the simultaneous identification and
division of agents, a logologically dialectic quality. On the other hand, identification of
the agent influences how the critic answers the pentadic questions and ultimately
understands the motivating term, which, as I will discuss later, can be understood in
direct relationship to an ideology.
While logology posits the inherent linguistic tension of dialectical terms that
Dramatism searches for, Jameson’s criticisms, published in two short essays in Critical
Inquiry in 1978, take issue with the status of history in Dramatism and Burke’s use of the
term ideology more specifically (both of which relate to Jameson’s criticism about
Purpose as a pentadic element). Because Jameson does not mention any of Burke’s
individual works by title (apart from an allusion to Language as Symbolic Action), I read
his criticisms as pervasive of Burke’s writings on Dramatism and symbolic action. Given
Jameson’s complaint about how Burke handles history, Robert Wess’ characterization of
The Rhetoric of Religion as a turn in Burke’s thinking that places “history in eclipse”
aligns with Jameson’s position (217-8). Both scholars see in Burke’s thinking a
problematic relationship between the theories of language as symbolic action and how
history develops within that model. For Burke, language is a sort of ultimate explanation
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for human experience which lends to it a mystic quality, but Jameson and others cannot
accept that assertion because it seems to reject the realities of collective historical
development. Because literature itself can be viewed as historical artifact and historical
text, logology’s marginalization of history becomes problematic for thinking about the
tensions caused by language in literature. Literary texts illustrate the basic linguistic
tensions that logology theorizes, but at the same time, many literary texts (and history in
general) defy Burke’s cycle of order, which proposes a pattern of order, guilt, and
victimage that is presumably unbreakable and unavoidable.
The Problem of the Cycle of Order
In order to reach the conclusion that the more general idea of logology remains a
useful concept within the Burkeian corpus and for literary analysis, it is necessary to
engage with Burke’s own difficulty in theorizing logology as well as understand how
Jameson’s critiques are legitimate. In the introduction to The Rhetoric of Religion, Burke
sets forth an explanation for his approach to logology, or “words about words”, through
theology, or “words about God” by presuming that because religious doctrine is both
verbal and thorough “its ways of exemplifying verbal principles should be
correspondingly thorough” (1). As theology is purely “words about God,” Burke saw that
its thoroughness would be most useful in understanding words about words and how
those words influence human action. Logology is problematic because it focuses on
individuals and sets limitations around the individual’s ability to act for different reasons.
Wess identifies the “deepest tension” in The Rhetoric of Religion as the tension between
“its methodological commitment to the most ‘thorough’ example and its logological
project: the method directs attention to history, but the project produces a psychology that
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puts history into eclipse” (221). For Wess, what Burke calls history is actually a
psychology that precludes the possibility for history to develop as a result of collective
struggle. The psychology of logology takes place within the subject creating discord
between individual struggle and collective struggle. Burke’s approach asserts that in
language there is a cycle of order which he, as often cited, writes a verse to summarize:
Here are the steps
In the Iron Law of History
That welds Order and Sacrifice:
Order leads to Guilt
(for who can keep commandments!)
Guilt needs Redemption
(for who would not be cleansed!)
Redemption needs Redeemer
(which is to say, a Victim!).
Order
Through Guilt
To Victimage
(hence: Cult of the Kill) …. (The Rhetoric 4-5)
The verse might be more convincing for Wess had Burke written “Here are the steps, / In
One Law of History.” For Wess, The Rhetoric of Religion makes it clear that
“[l]ogologically considered the subject is ‘de-termined” by the cycle of order outlined in
this verse, which leaves only one path for historical development—the cycle of order”
(219). Essentially, what Burke theorizes here is that order’s invitation to disorder leads
the human to feel guilty when the order is disturbed. Because the order is disturbed, the
human seeks to purge him or herself of the guilt over disrupting the order via a scapegoat.
Order and disorder come from language’s ability to allow man, who is “rotten with
perfection,” to imagine such perfection and then fall short of it, and the cycle proceeds to
guilt and victimage and so on. One problem with the cycle is that it assumes individuals
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will feel guilty about their deviation from the order; another problem is that it assumes
itself unbreakable.
The discrepancy between logology’s psychology and actual historical
development is one of both Wess and Jameson’s criticisms because the cycle of order that
leads to guilt and victimage implies that the cycle cannot be escaped. Wess writes: “[The
Grammar] presupposes the premise of the agon of history, that historical change is
possible. But in [The Rhetoric of Religion], the possibility of transformation in the agon
of history gives way to the disciplinary agon from which there is no exit. All roads are the
same: order, guilt, victimage” (227). While for Wess the writings on Dramatism and
identification made space for historical change, logology’s reliance upon the Ten
Commandments as an illustrative tool for the human impetus to disrupt order, feel guilty,
and seek out a scapegoat replaces the forces of historical struggle with a disciplinarian
psychology of the individual. As Elizabeth Weiser notes, however, Burke’s theorization
of logology is best understood as historically-bound to what he was observing in the
world in the mid-twentieth century (287). Just as Burke consistently remained aware that
things are often more complicated than they seem, it is unlikely that he saw the cycle of
order as a historical “law.” Rather, he more likely observed this pattern of behavior and
saw that the cycle of order actually needed to be broken. This becomes evident in his
discussion of how Hitler was able to turn the entire Jewish community into a “scapegoat”
or a common enemy in regard to the problems Germany was facing prior to WWII in his
essay, “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle” which can be found in The Philosophy of
Literary Form (191-220). Not to mention that his discomfort with the cycle of order is
evidenced by his search for alternatives.
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The order-disorder dialectic can limit historical patterns of development if it
assumes that social orders are never reconfigured. Therefore, for instance, the transition
from feudalism to capitalism could never have occurred. However, this socio-economic
reconfiguration did occur, and social orders in general can become reconfigured even
within the cycle of order because of the possibility of scapegoating. Even so, there is a
sense that guilt does not necessarily play a role in historical development, and Burke’s
own discomfort with the cycle of order lead him to consider the more desirable
alternative: covenant-countercovenant. As Wess recognizes, the order-disorder pair are a
more “natural dialectic” in the sense that they align with the yes-no of the disciplinary,
which made the pair appealing for Burke in the link to theology; however,
“Encompassing socio-political structures, the term ‘covenant’ has historical content that
its rival lacks, for ‘order’ is formalistically rooted in language’s yes-and-no” (222 italics
mine). Order and disorder align more seamlessly with the yes-no pair because when
subjects say yes or no to a particular orthodoxy, they are in essence also choosing order
or disorder. To say yes to the orthodoxy is to choose order; to say no to the orthodoxy is
to choose disorder.
This dialectic becomes a false binary precluding the possibility of multiple
orthodoxies existing. For literature, this is problematic because it outlines only one
possibility for the symbolic action occurring in a narrative. If the order-disorder dialectic
is the only option, then Dramatism will always produce an analysis that illustrates how
guilt, scapegoating, and redemption occur in any given human conflict. One of the issues
with this assertion is that it presumes an individual will feel guilty about defying any
given order. Wess points to Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe as an example of
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re-hierarchization that occurs as Crusoe denies his father’s wishes and chooses an
individualistic philosophy over conceding to his family’s wishes (28). Because history in
the real shows that competing orthodoxies exist simultaneously and that orthodoxies at
periodic moments overcome one another seemingly without the element of guilt, there is
evidence against the proposition of the cycle of order as the only way. Again, though,
Burke is best understood here cautioning against this pattern because of the potentially
problematic results of scapegoating.
Burke’s alternative to the order-disorder pair considers two types of disorder,
which he identifies as “mere disorder” and “deliberate allegiance to a counter-order” (The
Rhetoric 195). The deliberate allegiance to a counter-order involves saying no to one
order and then additionally saying yes to another; an extra step is involved. These types
of disorder taken together better represent what can happen in the world. Wess describes
this second type of disorder as a “yes-against-yes” which aligns with the covenantcountercovenant dialectic, mentioned above, that Burke could have used. He writes of the
idea of “saying yes to this orthodoxy or yes to that one: yes-against-no vs. yes-againstyes,” “[t]his latter is the choice between covenant or counter-covenant” (Wess 223) rather
than the choice between order and disorder. Wess sees the privileging of yes-against-yes
as “the moment when the constitutional act in [A Grammar Motives] reappears in [The
Rhetoric of Religion]” (223). Of this dilemma, Wess concludes:
On the one hand, [Burke’s] methodological commitment to ‘thoroughness’
recognizes that the yes-against-yes of the agon of history is more thorough than
the yes-against-no of the disciplinary agon. On the other hand, his new
representative anecdote, by privileging the disciplinary, requires that yes-againstyes be rewritten as yes-against-no. The methodological commitment has to yield:
the less thorough example has to be allowed to trump the more thorough—a
reversal that puts history into eclipse. (225)
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Because Burke holds onto the order-disorder dialectic, history as a force remains
marginalized in logology as Wess sees it. The covenant-countercovenant dialectic is
better able to account for how history shows that at various moments new ways of
thinking overcome old ways of thinking, but Burke abandons it.
Wess notes that the “deliberate allegiance to a counter-order” is “rewritten” to fit
the order-disorder dialectic rather than being accepted as a representative of another kind
of dialectic. However, if Burke’s choice to openly work through this inconsistency in his
writing is taken as an indication that he understood the cycle of order is not the only way,
then logology can still be of use to scholars. When viewed as a historically-bound project
that sought to accomplish something in the present, the “idiosyncrasies” can be accepted
for what they are, and the dialectical quality of language that logology is interested in
holds true as a way of thinking about how language creates material conflict. Covenant
and countercovenant, order and disorder, free-will and determinism, yes and no are still
versions of dialectical tension that contribute to history as humans make choices and act.
Burke’s own dilemma in seeking to work out this conflict gives credence to the idea that,
in spite of the cycle of order, this basic sense of language as dialectic that he is interested
in with logology can be useful.
Redemption for History in the Cycle of Order
While this dialectical quality can be harnessed in spite of the weakness of the
cycle of order, history does also make its appearance in the logological framework. Even
though the “Epilogue: Prologue in Heaven” holds onto the concept of the cycle of order,
the conversation between The Lord and Satan illustrates how humans erroneously rely on
language to resolve inconsistencies that cannot be resolved. Kristy Maddux argues that
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“Burke’s treatment of the relationship between theology and language is basically
descriptive, and he even seems uncomfortable with much of what he describes” (209);
however, she goes on to suggest that logology needs to be revised because “the
atonement cycle […] creates a world order where human rhetors have minimal agency in
their social situations” (222). Maddux seems to forget her own observation of Burke’s
“uncomfortablility” with the cycle of order. No better place than the “Epilogue” exists to
sense that there is something off with the cycle that Burke describes. The tone of the
conversation is somewhat jocular as Satan, with the help of The Lord, attempts to
understand how and why humans use language. At one point, they discuss what Satan
characterizes as the symbol-using animal’s contrivance “to put determinism and free will
together” (294). The Lord’s response highlights how the human’s free-will is limited to
the choice between terms in dialectical correspondence. According to Wess, “‘Forced to
be free’ in this de-terministic sense is different from the necessitarian sense we saw in
[the Grammar]. Necessitarian forcing is in the world; de-terministic, in language” (220).
“Necessitarian forcing” simply refers to the idea that in any given scenario an
individual is presented with a number of choices from which he or she gets to choose.
Earlier in the dialogue, The Lord states that in regards to necessitarian forcing (history),
“each person will necessarily make his decisions in the particular situations into which he
is ‘thrown’ (and each of these situations will involve a series of motives not of his own
choosing)” (282). The Lord does say that humans are “forced to be free” in their actions
because an act implies that a choice is made, but there is little difference between
necessitarian forcing in the world and “de-terminism” in language because language
gives name to that necessitarian forcing. Individuals are free to choose from among a
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range of options dictated by the progression of history. Forcing comes into play under the
circumstances of historical progression as the material factors that language gives
humans the ability to make sense of leave the individual agent with only so many options
from which to choose. Unlike the largest part of The Rhetoric of Religion, the “Epilogue”
acknowledges this reality. The conversation between The Lord and Satan ends midsentence in a metaphorical indication that the dialectic is infinite. Ultimately, it would
seem, the cycle of order is potentially only one part of its own larger dialectical tension.
Even if the “Epilogue: Prologue in Heaven” reserves a space for history, Jameson
still criticizes Burke in general for failing to teach history. He argues “for the bon usage
of [Burke’s] work, that it be used to learn history, even against his own inclination”
(“The Symbolic” 523). Allen Carter, like Weiser, argues that Burke’s focus on the order,
guilt, victimage cycle is an attempt to make his society aware of the pattern of
scapegoating in hopes that they will make the necessary actions to change what their
history might become if they allow fallout to occur: “Late Burke makes a courageous
attempt both to complete the metalinguistic or logological segment of his dramatist
system and to use a transhistorical category in a very specific historical situation with the
aim of prolonging human history” (235). As I have suggested, from this perspective, the
cycle of order can be seen as a diagnosis and potentially even the teaching of a history
that could begin to repeat itself if not acknowledged and corrected. The weaknesses
stemming from the cycle of order exist because Burke sought to help others recognize
what was actually happening in the world in order to change that history, not assert an
unalterable historical narrative.
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Even so, Burke himself, in a response essay to Jameson in the 1978 Winter
edition of Critical Inquiry, argues that “where matters of symbolicity are concerned […]
strictly historicist views of human institutions can be misleading” (“Methodological”
411). In opposition to Jameson’s charge, Burke writes: “[T]he ironic fact is that my
method of analysis is designed to strike a balance between the New Critics’ stress upon
the particular work in itself and Jameson’s ‘ideological’ stress upon ‘the ultimate horizon
of every cultural artifact’” (411). Burke’s method overall seeks to combine close reading
with historicist views of literature to produce what he would call a “rounded” analysis.
For Burke, Dramatism should both historically situate a text and understand the
motivating ideologies within that text as well as how those work together. An ideal not so
uncommon in standard practices of literary criticism today.
In producing a rounded Dramatistic analysis of a literary text that lives up to
conventional expectations, it is necessary to recognize that the dialectical quality of
language creates conflict in the material world. Burke wrote later in 1978 that “Logology
would see in religious patterns of thought… an entelechial principle implicit in language
at any time” (“Methodological” 411). Meaning, the entelechial principle exists in
language outside of the context that Burke used to illustrate his point. Whether a “yesagainst-no” or “yes-against-yes” dialectic, humans are symbol-using animals who are
“rotten with perfection.” In thinking about the relationship between logology, the pentad,
and identification then, the interest in literary analysis that Burke shared with Jameson,
and that I have sought to explain, relegates logology to a realm strictly for the purpose of
understanding that language generates drama. Logology itself is of course not the method
for literary analysis, but it does provide scholars with a foundation for thinking about
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how language spurs humans to involve themselves in drama and why a literary critic
would want to take up a dramatistic analysis—a motivating term or concept in a given
work of literature will be logologically dialectic.
Purpose in the Grammar
While it might be said that logology’s marginalization of history (in the cycle of
order) is reconciled by understanding it as more of a critique on Burke’s part, Jameson
still took issue with how Burke used the pentad itself. He criticizes the grammar as a
systematic strategy that ultimately disregards purpose, writing:
The concept of “strategy” in Burke’s critical practice thus seems to rule out of
bounds the very perspective it began by promising us, namely that vaster social or
historical or political horizon in which alone the symbolic function of those
symbolic acts which are the verbal and literary artifacts can become visible to us.
(“The Symbolic” 515)
His concern with the method of dramatism is that as a “strategy” for literary analysis it
obscures the purpose of the literary text itself within the historical context. Because the
elements of the pentad can be combined in a full array of ten ratios—scene-act, sceneagent, scene-agency, scene-purpose, act-purpose, act-agent, act-agency, agent-purpose,
agent-agency, agency-purpose—ambiguities are inevitable, and a statement of motive
will necessarily involve overlap among the terms. Because Dramatism seeks not to
eliminate ambiguities, Burke asserts that we should “consider it our task to study and
clarify the resources of ambiguity” (xix). The ambiguity between terms results from the
dialectical quality of the motivating term. By reducing the terms of the pentad to a
common causal source through their ambiguities, the critic can determine the philosophic
underpinning, or motive, and come to understand the drama in a new way.
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However, according to Wess, “The pentad never stops making the case for the act,
which is the claim of claims in the dramatistic view of language as action […] In the
pentad, all roads lead to the act” (181). In the Grammar, Burke focuses on scene, agent,
and act as the most important elements. Jameson describes this as the “Achilles heel” of
Burke’s system arguing that purpose is “amalgamated with Agency” in Dramatism’s
“grandiose mapping scheme” (515). He cites Burke’s claim that purpose is implicit in
other pentadic elements, namely act and agent, and forwards this point arguing that
purpose “is evidently implicit in the category of Scene also” (515). In order to rectify the
role of purpose in the method, Jameson asserts that “the subtext must be so constructed or
(re)constructed as to constitute not merely a scene or background, nor an inert context
alone, but rather a structured and determinate situation, such that the text can be grasped
as an active response to it” (“The Symbolic” 516-7). Jameson is arguing that a critic who
undertakes a Dramatistic analysis should understand a literary text as a historically bound
response to its specific historical moment. Otherwise, the critic runs the risk of producing
sheer ideology.
Based on Burke’s writings, the concept of circumference can help the literary
critic in resolving the problem with the neglect of purpose in the method. Circumference
works like concentric circles with multiple circumferences possible as the circle can be
made narrower or broader. Circumferences will necessarily depend upon historical
contexts, and those historical contexts will influence how the critic answers the pentadic
questions. Circumference can also be located strictly within the literary text without
reference to the historical context of the work itself, which, if taken alone, does leave
Dramatism subject to Jameson’s criticism. The problem with Burke’s privileging of
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scene, act, and agent extends into his discussion of circumference in the Grammar. He
again specifically identifies the scene-act and scene-agent ratios suggesting that
circumference implicates these in particular (A Grammar 79). He writes that the “choice
of circumference for the scene in terms of which a given act is to be located will have a
corresponding effect upon the interpretation of the act itself” (77). While circumference
does alter how the critic views scene, agent, and act by changing the amount of and type
of information available, it equally alters how the critic interprets agency and purpose
because that same available information implicates what a critic knows about the agency
of the agent as well as how that agent understands his or her purpose in the act. Although
he had previously emphasized the influence of circumference on scene, agent, and act,
later Burke seems to revise his position in an essay from 1978 on “Questions and
Answers about the Pentad” where he advises critics to use the pentad along with all of its
ratios and circumferences implying that agency and purpose are equally as important as
the others (334).
Various circumferences cause the pentadic ratios to shift and ambiguities certainly
arise. Overington’s use of the term “perspectives” is a useful way of thinking about what
circumference means in a Dramatistic analysis (135). Because changes in circumference
alter the critic’s as well as the characters’ perspective on the literary drama, Michael
Feehan argues that “we find just the kind of sliding back and forth among categories that
Burke intends as the hallmark of his Grammar” (“A Note”). Circumference allows for the
pentadic questions to be answered in ways that make their borders more ambiguous. By
looking both inside and outside the text as Jameson suggests, a critic can take into
account multiple circumferences that will provide the differing perspectives on the
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literary drama so as to produce an analysis that adequately accounts for how the text is
historically bound.
Just as Burke wanted critics to “follow the methodology of the Grammar toward
the Rhetoric,” it is helpful to look at an example that will illustrate how the pentad, its
ratios, and circumference work in relation to identification. In the case of Kilgore Trout
in Vonnegut’s Breakfast of Champions, which is discussed in more detail in the next
chapter, there is a moment in which Trout speculates that his life’s failures are caused by
someone else: “all I can think of is that I’m a character in a book by somebody who
wants to write about somebody who suffers all the time” (247). Apart from the reality
that Trout is a character in Vonnegut’s book, the narrator later inserts himself into the
narrative confirming that he has been in control of writing Trout’s life story. By reducing
the scope of the circumference, the critic might only take into consideration Trout’s
speculation. By broadening the scope, the critic understands both Trout’s speculation and
the narrator’s confirmation of that speculation. His act is writing science fiction novels
and his scene includes various locations in the U.S. The ratio in question has to do with
how Trout (the agent) understands his agency (production of art) as failure for the
accomplishment of someone else’s ends (purpose), an agency-purpose ratio that becomes
ambiguous. Ultimately, this becomes a matter of free-will in which Trout will deny that
he has free-will, privileging purpose in the ratio. At this point, free-will versus
determinism becomes the dialectical pair that motivates Trout’s worldview, so the critic
can identify him with that pair. In a Dramatistic analysis that satisfies Jameson’s
concerns, the critic would go one step further in broadening the circumference to situate
the narrative of Breakfast of Champions in relation to the historical moment that
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produced it (i.e. 1960s America). Dramatism is a flexible method of analysis that can
adjust to the needs of the symbolic action in question and may emphasize particular
aspects of the action depending upon the purposes of the analysis and the language of the
agent(s) involved.
Ideology in Identification
Logology’s basic dialectical assertion comes into the analysis through the
Rhetoric’s identification because the motivating term of a drama is typically a term that
suggests a belief or way of thinking that an agent becomes associated with, which will
necessarily maintain a dialectically opposing belief (as in the case of Trout and the
dialectic of free-will and determinism). As identification of the agent in the literature
typically involves associating the agent with a particular historically bound way of
thinking, the status of ideology in dramatistic analysis also becomes implicated by
Jameson’s discussion of history. The literary artifact, as something that produces its own
subtext, can lead the critic to make arguments about the text that are purely ideological
themselves, which is Jameson’s fundamental problem with Burke’s theories. This leads
Jameson to argue again that failure to balance text and subtext is “surely to produce sheer
ideology” (“Ideology” 512). As dramatism can help a critic to understand the influence of
ideology, or motivations for symbolic action, Burke’s Dramatism, as a system that
privileges act itself, espouses an ideology of individualism (“The Symbolic” 520).
Burke’s theorization of the method is based on an individualistic ideology which is
signaled by its interest in “the concept of the self or the subject” (520).
For Jameson, the problem is not so much that Burke’s system produces a cultural
and political ideology in relation to his historical moment, but that Burke fails to
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acknowledge it as such. In his essay “Ideology and Symbolic Action,” Jameson suggests
that when Burke does use the term ideology, he means it in the sense of a “false
consciousness” (see RM p. 104 for Burke’s definitions of ideology) (418). The way
Burke uses the term ideology prevents the critic from understanding ideology as worldviews that are always transforming. Because the concept of ideology implicates how the
Burkeian system is understood, Jameson argues that in a Dramatistic analysis the literary
critic must understand ideology in two ways. It must be understood as a system and a
function: “Ideology can take the form of a system of values and beliefs […] (or ‘world
view’)” which cannot be taken as a theory of “a concrete social practice,” but must
“undergo a dialectical reversal in which we now read its ‘values’ and attitudes as sheer
function […] or praxis of a given social class or group” (419 italics his). According to
Jameson, in order for the use of Burke’s method to avoid producing ideology itself, the
critic’s application of the method must acknowledge ideology as both a system and a
function for a given social group that can manifest itself in literary texts through either an
agent’s self-proclaimed beliefs or through characterizations of acts.
While Jameson’s charge against Burke for failing to adequately grapple with
ideology is warranted, Burke and Jameson hold different reasons for their interest in
ideology. Stephen Bygrave argues that “rhetoric and ideology are not the same thing, but
the latter is not to be understood without the former” (cited in Crable 118). In this case,
ideology cannot be understood apart from its rhetorical function. In “Ideology and
Symbolic Action,” Jameson identifies the fundamental difference between his own and
Burke’s relationship to ideology:
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For Burke, the concept of ideology is essentially an instrumental one whose
usefulness lies in its effectiveness in dramatizing the key concept of symbolic
action. My own priorities are the reverse of these, since I have found the concept
of symbolic action a most effective way of demonstrating the ideological function
of culture. (421)
As Wess suggests, A Rhetoric of Motives holds a “rhetoricized conception of [ideology]
as identification” (188). In the Burkeian sense of the new rhetoric, ideology serves the
function of identification. A persuaded audience, then, presumably identifies with the
worldview of the speaker or writer. For Burke, ideologies are expressed in symbolic
action. For Jameson, symbolic action usefully demonstrates how culture is ideological.
Ben Wetherbee makes sense of this distinction by suggesting that ideology allows Burke
to pinpoint motive within a literary text while Jameson wants to “to stand back,
describing the ideological purpose, function, and transformation” of the drama itself
(285). Jameson’s suggestions for how the literary critic should account for ideology in a
Dramatistic analysis allow for what Wetherbee sees as the compromise between Burke
and Jameson: “[T]he rhetorician can demystify the terms of ideological analysis […] And
the ideologist can pressure the rhetorician not to lose herself in the details--to remember
and foreground, as Jameson suggests, Burke’s often neglected category of dramatistic
‘purpose’” (286). With this compromise, Dramatism can understand how ideology
motivates action within the literary drama and how literary texts participate in the
function of ideology outside of the world of the narrative—an end with which Burke
himself seems not to have been at odds.
Transcending the Limits of Dramatism
As extensively as Burke wrote on Dramatism, many facets may come into play in
any given analysis. Transcendence is one Burkeian concept that becomes particularly
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useful if the method is used for the purpose of finding common ground within a
seemingly irreconcilable dialectic. In thinking about literary analysis, transcendence
becomes important if the critic is interested in whether or not the text makes an
intervention into the dialectic it finds itself a part of. For Burke, transcendence involves a
dialectical reversal of terms or ideas through which an “ultimate order” that “transcends
the diversity of individual voices” may emerge (Burke 186-97; Zappen 290). According
to James Zappen, after more than twenty years of developing “dialectical-rhetorical
transcendence,” “Burke comes to perceive the Hegelian and Marxist concepts of history
as part of the problem of competing ideologies and his version of Platonic transcendence
as the solution” (280). Notably, Zappen explains that “in the midst of the political
divisiveness of the 1930s,” Burke was interested in the possibility of “bridging
conflicting ideologies via transcendence” (280).
For a literary text to achieve transcendence, it would seemingly have to possess a
didactic quality in which competing viewpoints are made evident to the reader. The status
of the text’s ability to achieve transcendence would then depend upon whether or not it
develops a perspective in which those seemingly irreconcilable ideologies become
indistinguishable and a new order is established which encompasses that dialectic. As
Zappen explains, “transcendence is the adoption of a point of view by which opposites
cease to be opposites” (283). Dramatism can be used to locate the points at which
partisan views intersect in order to find common ground and achieve some sort of
solution that “transcends” the once perceived irreconcilable differences. In a Dramatistic
analysis of literature, a similar process can occur in which the critic determines whether
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or not the text’s perceived “ideal” worldview truly transcends the perceived ideological
conflict.
Although Burke took issue with all of Jameson’s criticisms, the notion of
Dramatism’s idiosyncrasies likely do a play a role in the theory’s lack of influence in
literary study. Burke’s effort to offer a relevant illustration that might affect immediate
change in his society placed limitations around the applicability of the method for literary
critics. It likely simply seems too complicated when scholars have been successfully
producing literary criticism without it. According to Weiser, Burke was interested in a
rhetorical project that would “help free the world in its fight against both fascism abroad
and commercialized patriotism, its manifestation at home” (292). By using representative
anecdotes that appealed to these specific concerns, Dramatism first appears as if it cannot
be transhistorical and seems fundamentally more difficult to use than it has to be.
Jameson finds weaknesses in Burke’s work because the project overall takes the
Dramatistic framework and uses it in a particular way that detracts attention away from
how it might be used in other contexts.
However, his reliance upon his own historical moment to illustrate the power of
his theoretical enterprise should not discredit the method’s potential. By understanding
logology as a theorization of language as symbolic action based on linguistic
dialecticism, the literary critic can use Dramatism to more fully understand how
ideologies function in literature. Jameson affords Burke the credit of having produced an
“incomparable critical and theoretical” body of work, which he saw as a signal of “the
false antitheses of an intrinsic and extrinsic criticism [being] dispelled, and a new and
more adequate conception of the function of literature and its criticism and history
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[being] developed” (“The Symbolic” 513, 523). If critics can begin to see logology as a
theoretical basis for the grammar and identification and see Dramatism’s usefulness in
relation to ideology and literature, then the fundamentals of the Dramatistic system can
be reclaimed for literary analysis.
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CHAPTER II

KILGORE TROUT:
BURKEIAN MYSTICISM AND PRAGMATISM

In the decades after his own service in World War II, Kurt Vonnegut offered
readers a slapstick, satirical perspective on the ills that were ravaging American society
beginning with his first ever book-length publication, 1952’s Player Piano. Although
Vonnegut resisted what were then reductions of his literary artistry to mere science
fiction, he continued on with his writing. By 1973, he had published six more novels,
three of which occurred in succession and maintain the development of the characters
Kilgore Trout and Eliot Rosewater. This trilogy includes God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater
(1965), Slaughterhouse-Five (1969), and Breakfast of Champions (1973). God Bless You,
Mr. Rosewater has received critical attention from scholars interested in its critiques of
capitalism and assertions of socialist views (McCammack, etc.). Slaughterhouse-Five is
typically read by critics within the realm of its relationship to WWII in particular, but
more specifically with concern for the structure of the novel, psychoanalytic approaches
to Billy Pilgrim’s “schizophrenia,” and Christian allegories (Cacicedo, Coleman,
Hinchcliffe, McGinnis, etc.). Breakfast of Champions, then, is popularly read for its
critique of American consumer culture and materialism coupled with its “PBS-style” of
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presentation in which critics have compared it to the aesthetic of Sesame Street
(Berryman, Kaiserman, Morace, etc.).
Valid as these readings may be, scholars have yet to note the parallels between
Vonnegut’s Tralfamadorian philosophy as religious parody and Burke’s theorization of
logology in the “Epilogue: Prologue in Heaven” of The Rhetoric of Religion. Not only are
there striking similarities between how these writers view human agency, but Burke’s
Dramatism becomes useful to understanding how free-will, as an emblem of human
agency, is the pivotal dialectical concept around which Vonnegut’s critiques of post-war
America revolve. Understanding, with the help of Burke, that Vonnegut posits the
certainty of human agency through religious parody allows for an alternative approach to
some of his earlier works. This analysis also allows for an understanding of the
inconsistencies that Vonnegut saw in the alliance between economic and theological
philosophies by uncovering the basic dialectical ratios that undergird each. Eventually,
what begins to stand out in Vonnegut’s seemingly indiscriminate critique of American
society is his own pragmatic worldview and valuation of dialectical thinking. In order to
reach this conclusion, however, one must begin to see Kilgore Trout as a Burkeian
mystic.
Logology, Temporality, and Free-Will
Primarily in Slaughterhouse-Five and Breakfast of Champions, Vonnegut, like
Burke, develops the groundwork for an intrinsic relationship among language as
symbolic action, temporality, and free-will. In a Trout novel called Pan-Galactic ThreeDay Pass, the earthling character, an English teacher, is on a “Space-Age Lewis and
Clark Expedition” where readers learn:
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The thing was that Earth was the only place in the whole known Universe where
language was used. It was a unique Earthling invention [...] The reason creatures
wanted to use language instead of mental telepathy was that they found out they
could get so much more done with language. Language made them so much more
active [...] language, with its slow, narrow meanings, made it possible to think
about one thing at a time. (Rosewater 173)
Not only does the passage directly state that language makes humans active, but it
appeals to the Burkeian way of seeing language as a tool that simultaneously focuses
attention on “one thing” while directing attention away from other things. Burke refers to
this phenomenon as a terministic screen, and he explains in Language as Symbolic Action
that “if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a
terminology it must be a selection of reality” (45). The result of this involves a
“deflection of reality” in which any terminology necessarily begins to influence the way
an individual sees the world in relation to that terminology (45). The aliens in Trout’s
story value the human language system because it allows them to think about ideas
individually rather than perceiving of all information indiscriminately through mental
telepathy. For them, the benefit is, as the narrator’s explains, the fact that they can simply
do more with language. For Burke, as noted in chapter I, there is a difference between
motion and action—motion is biological whereas action is symbolic because language
allows for speculation about the reason or motive for the actions (The Rhetoric 274). He
calls humans the “symbol-using animal” and argues that, by virtue of language, humans
become able to derive purposes for their lives (274). In short, language makes humans
active rather than simply motional because they can assign meaning to their actions.
Vonnegut shared with Burke an understanding of language as a purely symbolic system
that holds the power to induce action in those who use it.
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Although Vonnegut and Burke use different means to develop these ideas—
Vonnegut through fiction and Burke through theory—they both rely upon some
relationship to theology to do so. The book of John in the Christian New Testament
identifies Christ as “the Word” saying, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word
was with God, and the Word was God. He was with God in the beginning” (John 1:1-2).
Even so, there remains a sense that while God used language to speak the world into
existence, he himself does not need language in order to possess infinite knowledge. In an
essay that explores the relationship between time and experience in Slaughterhouse,
Martin Coleman explains, “Because God is eternal, God’s knowledge is unchanging;
being outside of time means knowing everything immediately, without gaps or any
process of comprehension” (687). In the godly realm, no sense of temporality exists and
no need for language exists apart from its relationship to humanity and the world. Like
the alien perspective in Trout’s novel that language “made it possible to think about one
thing at a time,” Burke suggests in the conversation between The Lord and Satan that
“[i]n dealing with ideas one at a time (or, as they will put it, ‘discursively’) [humans] can
do many things which can’t be done when, like us, all ideas are seen at once, and thus
necessarily corrected by one another” (282). Because language constitutes discursiveness,
it creates what Vonnegut’s Tralfamadorians refer to as the “illusion” of temporality.
Richard Hinchcliffe argues that the Tralfamadorian concept of time is “a reflection of
God’s omnipresent temporality, making Billy’s fantasy appear constructed from the
religious materials around him” (190). Not only is the Tralfamadorian philosophy that
Billy clings to constructed from “religious materials” however satirical they may be, but
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that self-same religious material is used by Burke to suggest that the discursiveness of
language bears some fundamental relationship to the human experience of temporality.
Both the Tralfamadorians of Slaughterhouse and the Lord and Satan of Burke’s
“Epilogue” converge on this point about temporality. According to the conversation
between The Lord and Satan, the ability to disobey God is created by temporality and is
therefore a linguistic implication of free-will. Satan asks The Lord if he has “solved a
basic logical contradiction” by making it possible for humans to disobey him by giving
them language (277). The Lord explains that the problem is not so simple:
My command is your obedience. But once the idea of logical contradiction is
modified by the possibility of temporal contradiction, the command can be at one
time, the obeying at another. And once there is the possibility of a breach between
them, here are the makings of contradiction, different from that of sheer logic.
(278)
Put even more simply, temporality created by language allows humans the opportunity to
disobey God which is in and of itself the exercise of free-will. For, as The Lord states, “a
pure act is by definition pure freedom” (The Rhetoric 281). Vonnegut was no rhetorician
but he need not be one in order to conceive of the influence of language on human
existence. In her discussion of logology, Kristy Maddux explains how “[r]hetorical
scholars largely agree that rhetorical agency lies somewhere between the free-will of a
rational, stable actor and the determining power of structure and language” (208). Like
Maddux implies, ambiguity is the reality of the dialectic, so free-will exists within a
range that is structured by language and the material world outside of the agent. This
ambiguity becomes important later when looking at how characters like Trout and Billy
can deny their agency. For now, Vonnegut and Burke shared the understanding that
language is implicit in the human ability to conceive of a temporal world.
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The Tralfamadorians teach Billy many of the same concepts that Burke’s
“Epilogue” covers, however, they do so to an end that allows him to deny responsibility
for his actions. A Tralfamadorian explains to Billy: “If I hadn’t spent so much time
studying Earthlings [...] I wouldn’t have any idea what was meant by ‘free will.’ I’ve
visited thirty-one inhabited planets in the universe, and I have studied reports on one
hundred more. Only on Earth is there any talk of free will” (85-6). Because only on Earth
does anyone use language or “talk” of free-will, Vonnegut links language to the human
ability to conceive of, what is for the Tralfamadorians, the illusion of temporality. Billy
claims that the most important thing he learned on Tralfamadore was that “[a]ll moments
past, present, and future, always have existed, always will exist. The Tralfamadorians can
look at all different moments just the way we can look at a stretch of the Rocky
Mountains […] It is just an illusion that we have here on Earth that one moment follows
another one” (27 italics mine). The Tralfamadorians and the Lord and Satan of the
“Epilogue” inhabit similar un-Earthly dimensions where neither needs to use language,
but where Burke’s Lord and Satan acknowledge free-will and temporality for humans,
the Tralfamadorians deny both.
Because the Tralfamadorian philosophy denies free-will in an ironic
representation of Christian theology, their understanding of human purpose and motive
becomes an inversion of Burke’s. Having also referred to the conversation between The
Lord and Satan as a “Parable of Purpose,” Burke’s logology suggests that humans are
inclined to speculate about purpose(s) in their lives because of language. In the
“Epilogue,” Burke’s narrator explains that “language makes questioning easy,” so
humans “raise problems—and many purposes are but attempts to solve those problems
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[…] Hence, the search for some Grand Over-All Purpose, as with philosophers,
metaphysicians, theologians” (275). Burke has established that language and the
temporality it creates implicate free-will and consequently human agency.
Simultaneously, language allows humans to speculate about the purpose(s) of their lives
thereby making the distinction between human agency and purpose sometimes
ambiguous in the Burkeian sense. In regards to the agency-purpose ratio of Dramatism,
the prospect of free-will can seem irreconcilable with the idea of a purpose, or perhaps
even a “destiny,” involved in human life because destiny does in some sense limit the
possibilities of human agency. The Tralfamadorian philosophy differs from Burke’s
proposition because, not only do they deny free-will (or human agency) and temporality
altogether, but they deny the prospect of purpose as well.
While the conversation between the Lord and Satan explains how language allows
humans to make sense of their world, the Tralfamadorian philosophy allows Billy to
reject the sense-making of language for the “truth.” When he asks the Tralfamadorians
why they have abducted him, they respond:
‘That is a very Earthling question to ask, Mr. Pilgrim. Why you? Why us for that
matter? Why anything? Because this moment simply is. Have you ever seen bugs
trapped in amber?’ […] ‘Well, here we are, Mr. Pilgrim, trapped in the amber of
this moment. There is no why.’ (76-7)
This language allows Billy to justify his having come to find life “meaningless” or, in
other words, without purpose given the series of incomprehensible traumas he has
experienced in his life (Slaughterhouse 101). The Tralfamadorian assertion that “there is
no why” also denies the possibility of motive within action. As Burke has identified
language itself as a motive in logology, it comes as no surprise that Vonnegut’s
Tralfamadorians, who see language as futile, would corroborate the sense that purpose
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and motive are fundamentally connected to language. Where Burke offers a
straightforward interpretive parallel between theology and logology’s assertion of
agency, the Tralfamadorians, in their denial of agency, represent what postwar American
Christianity had become as observed by Vonnegut. By comparing the Tralfamadorian
philosophy to Burke’s “Epilogue”, Vonnegut’s critique becomes clearer as he shows how
a religious philosophy that is truly motivated by a purpose-agency ratio becomes
transformed into something else. The violence of a public trauma like war fundamentally
resists the kind of sense-making that language allows and often leaves individuals with a
sense of powerlessness. The result is that conceptions of human agency can become
compromised. Though Burke’s “Epilogue” is a more straightforward take on how
Christian theology, via its parallels with logology, necessarily implicates free-will to
some degree, Vonnegut’s Tralfamadorians are a satirical image of how one might view
Christian beliefs in practice in postwar America. The Tralfamadorians deny free-will in
an ironic take on a Christian belief system that should, for Vonnegut, lead to the same
conclusion as Burke’s. In its insistent denial of temporality, free-will, and purpose,
Tralfamadorianism suppresses the possibilities of the dialectic.
Although Burke clearly sees an implicit link between language and human agency
in the temporal realm, Vonnegut’s stake in that claim is less clear until Breakfast of
Champions. The standard readings of Tralfamadorianism are, at least, not to see
Vonnegut advocating the denial of agency and purpose. In fact, Peter F. Parshall argues
that “at root, the Tralfamadorian philosophy suggests adopting a detached stance from the
problems of the world” yet Vonnegut uses that philosophy ironically in order to reject it
(50-2). However, reading Tralfamadorianism as irony in its own right may not be enough
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for some to see Vonnegut laying claims similar to Burke’s. Dramatistically analyzing the
characterization of Trout’s actions in Breakfast becomes central to seeing those claims at
work as the narrator’s role in his life-story becomes more evident.
Dramatistic Analysis of Kilgore Trout
While Trout is a minor character in God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater and
Slaughterhouse-Five, his character is central to the narrative of Breakfast of Champions.
Broadly speaking, the story follows Trout as he travels to Midland City, Ohio for an arts
festival where he will cross paths with Dwayne Hoover ultimately resulting in a “violent
rampage” on Dwayne’s part. As someone who has most often believed throughout the
trilogy that his writings cannot affect anyone, the narrator explains that Trout “began to
assemble in his mind a system of beliefs which would be appropriate to his narrow
mission in Midland City, which was to show provincials, who were bent on exalting
creativity, a would-be creator who had failed and failed” (202). From the Dramatistic
perspective, Trout is the agent. His act is presumably the creation of art, or in his case
specifically writing fiction, implicated by the fact that his intent was to show the
attendees of the arts festival a “would-be creator who had failed and failed.” His agency
in the narrator’s explanation of his actions is the ability to create art, but readers know
that Trout sees himself lacking agency because he believes he has failed to create art. As
a result, he speculates that he is character in a book saying to his pet bird, “Honest to
God, Bill, the way things are going, all I can think of is that I’m a character in a book by
somebody who wants to write about somebody who suffers all the time” (247).
In seeking to understand his seeming inability to effectively create art, Trout
speculates that he must be lacking in the agency to do so and attributes his misfortunes to
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a purpose determined by someone else. Though Trout has accomplished the writing of his
novels, he senses that he has not achieved his purpose in having written them because he
believes no one reads them. The agency-purpose ratio becomes ambiguous, as Burke says
it should in a motivating pair, as Trout attempts to understand this conflict in his own life.
Within this ambiguity of terms, Trout privileges purpose relegating his agency to
someone or something greater than himself signaling his own denial of free-will. For
Trout, this “failure” to create art seems explainable only by attributing the occurrence to
some predestined or divine purpose. This fundamental ratio follows Trout through the
Rosewater Trilogy and ultimately implicates both Billy Pilgrim and Eliot Rosewater.
After all, Billy originally learns of the Tralfamadorians in a Kilgore Trout science-fiction
novel.
Although Vonnegut makes it clear that this is the limit of Trout’s understanding
of his own experience through the scope of his personal circumference, the dialectical
quality of motivating terms necessarily implies that free-will and its opposite must exist
simultaneously. As mentioned, the reality for Burke is that some degree of human agency
exists within the confines of a world structured by history and by language. Vonnegut
calls Trout’s perception of his agency into question by constructing a metaphor based on
the Biblical story of Adam and Eve. Even so, Vonnegut can be difficult for readers to
understand because he seems to satirize indiscriminately. After all, he confirms the truth
in Trout’s suspicion that he is a character in a book when the narrator reveals himself as
the author of Trout and Dwayne’s story. When the narrator writes himself into the drama
at the hotel, he says of himself: “I was on par with the Creator of the Universe there in the
dark in the cocktail lounge” (205). Learning this would seem to imply that Trout does
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not, in fact, have free-will; however, readers must follow the story to its end in order to
see the scope of the circumference broadened to fully accommodate the narrator’s
relationship to Trout.
The Metaphor of the Fall
While Slaughterhouse-Five is where readers come to learn of the Tralfamadorian
philosophy, Breakfast of Champions arrives a few years later marking out more
definitively Vonnegut’s interjection into the question of human free-will. In Breakfast as
in the “Epilogue: Prologue in Heaven”, Adam and Eve’s metaphorical “fall from grace”
is taken as the symbol of human claims to agency. The narrator of Breakfast writes:
“What was the apple which Eve and Adam ate? It was the Creator of the Universe” (206).
Having just imagined himself “on par with the Creator of the Universe,” the narrator’s
claim that the apple which Adam and Eve ate was the Creator leaves readers to interpret
the eating of the apple as man’s “destruction” of a creator whose purposes for them could
have trumped their human agency. The active decision to eat the apple is man’s first act
of free-will. Just as Satan says to The Lord in the “Epilogue, “I myself have felt that there
is a kind of ‘fall’ implicit in your creation of a time-world,” the narrator implicates the
same position through the offer of the apple by the serpent (278). He states: “What is
time? It is a serpent which eats its tail” (205). According to the Hebrew Bible, the serpent
offers Eve the apple which she in turn offers to Adam. As suggested by The Lord in
Burke’s “Epilogue,” temporality allows for a gap between the command and the obeying
of the command. A serpent that is symbolic of time offers the opportunity for Eve to
choose sin. Through this Biblical metaphor, Vonnegut, like Burke, suggests that there is
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an implicit relationship between Christian theology and the certainty of a degree of freewill in a temporal world.
Because of the narrative structure and multiple story lines of Breakfast of
Champions, the relationship among these symbols is not immediately apparent nor do
readers know how these ideas affect Trout until the final scene. After having endured
Dwayne Hoover’s rampage in which Trout’s finger is bitten off, the narrator reveals his
identity to Trout in the middle of a street at night. While Trout is reluctant to look at him,
the narrator says, “I want you to raise your eyes, to look at what I have in my hand [...] I
hold in my hand a symbol of wholeness and harmony and nourishment” (301). When
Trout looks, the narrator says, “He saw that I held an apple in my hand” (301), and he
goes on to state, “Arise, Mr. Trout, you are free, you are free” (302). At this point, it
becomes clear that the apple is symbolic of freedom. Although William Meyer rejects the
idea that the apple is a Biblical symbol arguing instead that it represents an Emersonian
nature, he does recognize it as a symbol of Trout’s freedom (102). Given the emphasis on
Adam and Eve’s destruction of the Creator by eating the apple, the narrator, who has also
likened himself to the creator of a universe, constructs a significant parallel between his
relationship to Trout through the apple and the Creation story, in which Adam and Eve
commit “original sin.” From the scope of this perspective, it becomes dialectically true
that the narrator has only ever controlled Trout’s life to a degree—therefore, he does
possess agency. The narrator affirms this notion in the cocktail lounge: “Here was the
thing about my control over the characters I created: I could only guide their movements
approximately, since they were such big animals” (Breakfast 207).
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Having forwarded the proposition that according to Christian theology original sin
is the first act of human free-will, Vonnegut, with the help of Burke, provides a new way
of understanding his position on social equality in God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater through
the reading of Slaughterhouse-Five and Breakfast of Champions. Perhaps having come to
find that Rosewater’s message was not as clear as it could be, Vonnegut’s development
of these later themes allows for a more decisive reading of Eliot’s idealistic humanism.
As Adam Kaiserman points out in his discussion of Breakfast, critics tend to agree that
Trout denies the opportunity to seize upon free-will as his response is “less than pleased”
and the story ends (342). Because Trout has been guided by his belief that he lacked
agency, he has also been able to blame his failures on the deterministic purposes of some
more powerful entity. When the narrator offers him his freedom, he initially rejects it
because acceptance takes away the comfort of denying responsibility for one’s own
actions.
When Humans Become Machines
Because Vonnegut, like Burke, has pointed out this way of understanding one of
the most fundamental stories of Christianity as a certain implication of free-will, his
actual indictment of the problem of Tralfamadorianism becomes more clear. Not only, he
is saying, have Americans adopted this way of seeing themselves in the world, but many
have done so on the contradictory basis of a Christianity that accepts denial of human
agency. From a materialist perspective, this denial of agency is exacerbated by the legacy
of a divine alliance between Christianity and Capitalism, one that Marx and Engels
characterized in The Communist Manifesto as capitalist exploitation “veiled by religious
and political illusions” (68). Trout’s influence on Dwayne Hoover ties these mystic and
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materialist philosophies to one another as a starting point for Vonnegut’s own critique of
the way that a Dramatistically material system like capitalism becomes purely mystified
to the extent of suppressing the dialectic and justifying social inequalities.
In fact, Dwayne shows readers what can happen when human beings have begun
to be perceived as machines rather than human beings. Trout’s novel Now It Can Be Told
“was in the form of a long letter from the Creator of the Universe to the only creature in
the Universe who had free will” (58). In the book, Dwayne read:
“Dear Sir, poor sir, brave sir:” [...]“You are an experiment by the Creator
of the Universe. You are the only creature in the entire Universe who has free
will. You are the only one who has to figure out what to do next--and why.
Everybody else is a robot, a machine.”
“Some persons seem to like you, and other seem to hate you, and you must
wonder why. They are simply liking machines and hating machines.”
“You are pooped and demoralized,” [...] “Why wouldn’t you be? Of
course it is exhausting, having to reason all the time in a universe which wasn’t
meant to be reasonable.” (259)
Taking the letter literally, Dwayne grows angry and attacks several other characters,
including Trout, because he comes to believe that it does not matter what he does to them
if they are machines instead of humans. By seeing people as machines, a Marxist read of
this letter shows how the industries that capital growth depends upon dehumanize people
in the interest of capital. Not only does the letter state that only Dwayne has free-will
implying that the “machines” do not, it goes on to state that Dwayne’s universe “wasn’t
meant to be reasonable.” If the Creator of the Universe only creates machines who have
no free-will and no sense of reason, not only is there a sense that again the dialectic is
suppressed, but Vonnegut has extended his critique of this alliance between the mystic
and the material through Trout’s science fiction novel.
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For Vonnegut, the problem stems from the exchange of the motivating ratios
between these mystic and material philosophies when they meet. American notions of
Christianity begin to assimilate the scene-agent ratio into the mystic religious philosophy
while notions of capitalism begin to assimilate the agency-purpose ratio into the material
capitalist philosophy. Dwayne’s conception of humans as machines who lack free-will
underscores this crossing of motivating pairs when considered in light of the
Tralfamadorian interest in Charles Darwin. As the narrator of Slaughterhouse claims
about economics, religion gets “mixed up in it,” and he explains his claim when he
discusses the Tralfamadorians in relation to Jesus Christ:
On Tralfamadore, says Billy Pilgrim, there isn’t much interest in Jesus Christ. The
Earthling figure who is most engaging to the Tralfamadorian mind, he says, is
Charles Darwin--who taught that those who die are meant to die [...] The same
general idea appears in The Big Board by Kilgore Trout. The flying saucer
creatures who capture Trout’s hero ask him about Darwin. (210-11)
The proposition that “those who die are meant to die” adheres to the philosophy of
Tralfamadorianism because it rejects the possibility of human agency. Because Vonnegut
expressly gives the Tralfamadorians interest in Darwin rather than Christ, scholars have
found it reasonable to interpret their philosophy as a brand of Social Darwinism. This
worldview affirms a “survival of the fittest” philosophy on the social relations of
humanity. As Parshall noted back in 1987, the Tralfamadorians “serve as representatives
of that considerable proportion of humankind which shows little concern for their fellow
creatures” (51). When interpreted based on Dramatism, Darwin’s notions of survival of
the fittest operate on a scene-agent ratio. Dwayne’s understanding of humans as machines
who have no free-will coupled with Tralfamadorian determinism implicates a shared
assumption that agents who are best suited for any given material scene will be so
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inherently without allowance for the possibility of human agency. Ultimately, the
Tralfamadorians come to represent a mystic religious belief system that has become
materialized in the Burkeian sense.
As a way of satirizing this “divine” alliance, the narrator of Rosewater explains
that Trout’s novel, The Big Board, is about two Earthlings who are kidnapped by extraterrestrials and given a large sum of money to invest in the capitalist stock market so that
they might be returned to Earth with a vast amount of money. Later, the narrator of
Slaughterhouse explains how Billy read in Trout’s book that:
“[t]he Earthlings did very well on paper. That was part of the rigging, of course.
And religion got mixed up in it, too. The news ticker reminded them that the
President of the United States had declared National Prayer Week, and that
everybody should pray. The Earthlings had had a bad week on the market before
that. They had lost a small fortune in olive oil futures. So they gave praying a
whirl. It worked. Olive oil went up.” (202)
What readers know from this passage is that the relationship between how these
Earthlings are faring on the stock market and their prayer is arbitrary, even imaginary.
Though this is an example of one of Vonnegut’s most thinly-veiled critiques, it is worth
explaining that he appears to be taking issue with “mixing up” of economics and religion.
While these characters could envision their ability to appeal to a divine power as an
expression of human agency, Vonnegut seems to be suggesting that there is something
illogical about the way in which these competing philosophies are coalesced by the
human agent.
The Tralfamadorian philosophy that allows Billy to reject his own free-will also
allows him to deny responsibility if and when his actions negatively impact someone
else—a notion not so different from traditional conceptions of Social Darwinism. The
Tralfamadorian refusal to stop the pilot from pressing the button which they know
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destroys the entire universe is the ultimate example of this unrelenting determinism. Not
only are the Tralfamadorians able to comfortably accept that the universe ends in this
way, but they are comfortably able to deny any responsibility for not intervening.
Although Trout does, as Breakfast of Champions’ narrator explains, ultimately become a
“fanatic” about the fact that “we are healthy only to the extent that our ideas are humane”
(15-6), the trauma of Billy’s war experiences are too much for him and he never
overcomes his apathy. As a middle-aged optometrist, Billy’s life philosophy is summed
up by the serenity prayer that he has posted on the wall in his office, which reads:
GOD GRANT ME
THE SERENITY TO ACCEPT
THE THINGS I CANNOT CHANGE,
COURAGE
TO CHANGE THE THINGS I CAN,
AND WISDOM ALWAYS
TO TELL THE
DIFFERENCE. (60)
The narrator immediately adds, however, that “[a]mong the things Billy Pilgrim could not
change were the past, the present, and the future” (60). Regardless of the “dramas” Billy
finds himself involved in, this becomes the explanation for his role in them. From a
Dramatistic perspective, the appendage that Billy could not change the past, present, or
future rhetorically denies Billy’s agency in favor of a past, present, and future that serve
some predetermined purpose for which he lacks the ability to alter. Although Billy’s war
experiences largely contributed to his need to understand life in this way, Paul J. Ramsey,
paraphrasing Vonnegut, reminds us that “wars represented a loss of free will (Vonnegut,
1998, p. 87), and this, Vonnegut posits, might be reversible” (214).
Taken together, Breakfast of Champions and Slaughterhouse-Five begin to spell
out a more definitive perspective from Vonnegut as a satirist with the revelation that
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Tralfamadorianism represents a materialized Christian philosophy. With the focus on
religious metaphor in these two installments of the Rosewater Trilogy, Vonnegut clearly
suggests that inconsistencies have arisen between the way that Americans practice
Christianity in the postwar era and the linguistic implications of that theology itself.
Vonnegut’s own religious beliefs or lack thereof need not be taken into account in order
to see his point. Through parallels to Burke, it becomes clear that Vonnegut’s fiction is
“theorizing” the certainty of human agency and taking issue with the apathy of postwar
America. In fact, Vonnegut and Burke also seem to be suggesting that the certainty of
free-will or human agency exists outside of the theological context, as they draw these
connections from language itself. Language constitutes discursiveness which qualifies
temporality. In turn, temporality guarantees the prospect of free-will because the human
agent becomes able to make choices. Trout, Dwayne, and Billy face this philosophical
question from competing perspectives, and together they show how complex the question
becomes as well as how the question can transform the agent. Though Vonnegut’s
assertion of human agency is clear through the critique of Tralfamadorianism thus far,
chapter III further explores the relationship between Christianity as a philosophy that
rests upon a purpose-agency ratio and capitalism as a philosophy that rests upon a sceneagent or scene-act ratio when human agents begin to see these philosophies as allies.
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CHAPTER III

ELIOT ROSEWATER:
BURKEIAN MYSTICISM AND IDEALISM

In terms of Vonnegut’s shared interests with Kenneth Burke, chapter II develops
the foundation for the theoretical relationship between language as symbolic action
through logology and the remaining implications for human agency. Looking back with
that foundation, a closer consideration of Eliot Rosewater in God Bless You, Mr.
Rosewater (1965) allows for a new understanding of Eliot’s view of social injustices that
primarily stem from wealth inequality. Although Rosewater is largely clear about its
humanitarian philosophy through the voices of Eliot and Trout, Vonnegut’s satire can
sometimes insinuate contradictory messages (everyone and everything is subject to
critique). Consequently, reading Eliot’s story within the context of the later installments
of the Rosewater Trilogy and Burke’s Dramatism allows for a more decisive
understanding of what his character stands for. In its opposition to the injustices of the
true workings of the “American Dream,” Rosewater offers what many scholars have seen
as an alternative model in Eliot however flawed he may seem as a person. If Vonnegut’s
intent was to suggest that Eliot’s “Gospel-inspired socialism” (McCammack)—loving
people simply because they are human—could combat the social injustices in American
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society, then the matter of whether that proposition achieves Burkeian transcendence over
the mystification of capitalism and the materialization of (Christian) theology is called
into question. However hopeful and desirable his philosophy may be, its pure idealism
evades the conflict Eliot seeks to overcome by discrediting the influence of the free-will
dialectic in the rhetoric used to justify social inequalities through both economic and
religious appeals.
As suggested of the Tralfamadorian philosophy, Vonnegut constructs an image of
postwar American religious sentiment that emphasizes a general sense of apathy. In the
face of large-scale trauma and conflict, individual human agency understandably begins
to seem compromised. While this sense of apathy is connected to war in Slaughterhouse
in particular, it is linked to wealth inequality in the earlier Rosewater narrative. The
philosophical terminologies which Burke lays out in relation to each pentadic element
become essential to understanding how these religious and economic belief systems
begin to influence one another as human agents assimilate them into their own
worldviews. For Burke, religious philosophies are necessarily mystic in their reliance
upon a purpose-agency ratio. Though purpose is often privileged in the application of
theological frameworks, human agency remains an essential aspect of the philosophies’
functionality. Similarly, Burke’s Grammar suggests that economic systems (like
capitalism) are necessarily materialist and typically rest upon either a scene-agent or
scene-act ratio. Here again, though scene is often privileged as the determining factor in
the application of economic frameworks, the nature of the act or the agent is still a critical
aspect of the philosophy’s functionality. On simpler terms, the ratios reject notions of
essentialism based on the reality that human conflict cannot typically be reduced to a
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single factor (i.e. the dialectic resists the idea that scene could be the only determining
factor within any given drama).
In the Rosewater Trilogy, Vonnegut shows how the ratios underpinning these
respective philosophies become reimagined or reinterpreted by the human agents who
rely on these philosophies to make sense of their world. This is the point at which the
discussion begins to implicate Eliot in God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater. Just as the
Tralfamadorians show how theology becomes reinstituted as a material philosophy by its
association with Social Darwinism, so American capitalism becomes reinstituted as a
mystic philosophy by its association with religious belief that is manifested in the concept
of the American Dream. To summarize, Tralfamadorianism represents a once religious
philosophy that comes to rest upon a scene-agent ratio rather than a purpose-agency ratio.
Likewise, capitalism is a material philosophy that rests upon a scene-act or scene-agent
ratio but, with the concept of the American Dream, becomes a mystic philosophy that
rests upon a purpose-agency ratio embodied by notions of the assurance that hard-work
will necessarily pay-off.
Eliot’s Purpose
On Burkeian terms, reading the latter two installments of the Rosewater Trilogy
broadens the scope of the circumference around Eliot in particular because he is the
protagonist of the first installment, Rosewater. Because Eliot and Trout are featured in
some way in each of the books, pieces to their individual stories can be found throughout
the series that can modify earlier conceptions of their characters. This idea is particularly
important for Eliot’s character because information provided about him after the
publication of God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater significantly impacts how his character can
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be understood. Having been a soldier in WWII, Eliot, after discovering that he had
unwittingly killed a fourteen-year-old German firefighter, found himself in a psychiatric
hospital where he would meet Billy Pilgrim. Readers learn in Slaughterhouse-Five that
Eliot and Billy had both come to find life meaningless (partly because of the war), so
they were trying to “reinvent” themselves and their universe through Trout’s science
fiction (101). Throughout Rosewater, readers do know that Eliot had spent time in a
psychiatric hospital after the war but, without Slaughterhouse, readers lack the context
that becomes available for understanding Eliot’s life in relation to the Tralfamadorian
philosophy. The Eliot Rosewater whom readers first meet has presumably already been
introduced to many of the Trout novels and ideas that have yet to be introduced into the
Vonnegut cosmos in 1965 when Rosewater was published.
Broadening the circumference to accommodate the Tralfamadorianism of
Slaughterhouse-Five and the theological metaphors of Breakfast of Champions alters the
perception of Eliot’s humanism. In Slaughterhouse, the narrator reveals how Eliot had
previously believed that “everything there was to know about life was in The Brothers
Karamazov by Fyodor Dostoevsky, ‘But that isn’t enough any more’” (101). Because
Dostoevsky’s novel also presents the free-will dialectic as one of its major themes in
relation to theology, Eliot’s reported abandonment of that novel (in favor of Trout’s
science fiction) for the answer to all there was to know about life automatically links him
to the later critiques that Vonnegut pursues through Tralfamadorianism. The Brothers
Karamazov deals with the burden of free-will and the status of good and evil in the world
if God does exist. Dostoevsky’s conclusion is similar to both Burke and Vonnegut’s in
that he too imagines humans having free-will but adds to it the implication that believing
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in God morally obligates an individual to choose good over evil. Like Burke and
Vonnegut, Dostoevsky's own novel emphasizes the dialectically necessary element of
human agency within a mystified, purpose-driven philosophy. In this sense, the religious
ethic that Dostoevsky asserts would have to stand in stark contrast to Tralfamadorianism
and could even be labeled its antithesis. This distinction is important in consideration of
Eliot’s abandonment of Dostoevsky because it indicates that Eliot has, like the Trout of
Slaughterhouse and Breakfast, begun to reject notions of human agency.
Because of his war experiences as well as perhaps his serendipitous birth into a
wealthy family, Eliot finds that Dostoevsky’s views on life no longer make up the
sufficient philosophical framework for explaining his own experiences. After all, he
quips while in the psychiatric hospital in Slaughterhouse, “I think you guys are going to
have to come up with a lot of wonderful new lies, or people just aren’t going to want to
go on living” (101). Eliot’s suspicion for traditional beliefs is perhaps indicative of
Vonnegut’s own attitude toward dominant worldviews in mid-twentieth century America.
Paul J. Ramsey points out in a discussion about learning civics from Vonnegut that he
“recognized that societies were mere human constructions, which, as he noted in an
interview in Playboy, ‘means we don’t have to continue this way if we don’t like it’ (p.
279)” (210). Eliot’s conception of these kinds of belief systems as “wonderful” lies is
reflective of Vonnegut’s own comments on societal constructions, but Vonnegut allows
Eliot to find a new way to continue on through reading Trout’s fiction.
Not unlike Billy and his Tralfamadorian philosophy in Slaughterhouse or Trout in
Breakfast, Eliot explains his seemingly bizarre behavior by privileging some purpose
outside of himself instead of his own human agency. His language indicates that he sees
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himself having no choice but to love and provide assistance to the poor. This language
can first be seen in a letter to Sylvia where he explains why he has abandoned his
position at the Rosewater Foundation in New York City writing, “But from somewhere
something is trying to tell me where to go, what to do there, and why to do it” (Rosewater
31). Then later, near the novel’s end when Eliot will soon leave Rosewater for the trial,
he makes a claim with similar implications to a Rosewater County citizen who speculates
that he will not return by saying:
The minute I got near any navigable body of water, a bolt of lightning would
knock me into the water, a whale would swallow me up, and the whale would
swim down to the Gulf of Mexico and up the Mississippi, up the Ohio, up the
Wabash, up the White, up Lost River, up Rosewater Creek. And that whale would
jump from the creek into the Rosewater Inter-State Ship Canal, and it would swim
down the canal to this city, and spit me out in the Parthenon. (149)
Eliot’s words indicate his belief in a destiny that has placed him in Rosewater, Indiana to
do his work for the Rosewater Foundation. From the Dramatistic perspective, Eliot is the
agent and his scene is the United States but more specifically the town of Rosewater. His
general act throughout the narrative involves talking to and occasionally giving money to
the poor, which he describes as loving them simply because they are human. In Eliot’s
view of his own actions, “from somewhere something” is dictating his scenes, his acts,
and his purpose in performing those acts. He never expressly identifies his agency
because it seems to have been assimilated into purpose of his actions creating a purposeagency ratio in which he privileges a purpose attributed to fate.
On Burkeian terms, Eliot’s explanation makes the distinction between his purpose
and his agency ambiguous, however, he does seem to privilege purpose evidenced by his
word choice. Eliot later characterizes his mission to love people as a “work of art” (36),
which indicates a noteworthy connection to Burke’s own consideration of art in relation
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to the agency-purpose ratio. In A Grammar of Motives, Burke writes, “Since art is a
medium, the Art for Art’s Sake formula would embody the grammatical form: Agency its
own Purpose” (289). This seems to be precisely the ambiguity at hand in Eliot’s own
characterization of his actions. Burke goes on to say that the dilemma here becomes
“whether to call Art for Art’s Sake a pragmatist featuring of Agency or a mystic featuring
of Purpose” (290). Coupled with the previous insistence that something else is directing
him, Eliot can be seen to fall on the mystic side of this dilemma. In regard to the
discussion of mystic philosophies in chapter II, then, Eliot seems to see himself
altogether lacking free-will. He understands his purpose of loving people as the
controlling factor in the actions he is and is not able to pursue. As Burke would say,
Eliot’s agency, his “work of art” in this case, becomes an implicit instrument of his
purpose.
“Samaritrophian” Apathy
In much the same way that Billy’s belief in the Tralfamadorian philosophy
becomes a critique of the materialization of Christian theology, Vonnegut creates
Sylvia’s “Samaritrophia” as a critical diagnosis of the effect that the mystification of
capitalism has on Americans through its alliance with Christian theology. Throughout the
main plot of Rosewater, Eliot finds meaning in his life by loving people who are typically
considered unlovable (the poor in this case), and he stands in stark contrast to all of the
other characters in the Rosewater Trilogy for this reason. As readers learn about how
Eliot and his wife, Sylvia, use their wealth to care for the poor, they also learn that Sylvia
found it increasingly difficult to share Eliot’s passion. In a blatantly metaphorical
description of the psychological disease which Sylvia suffers from, her psychiatrist, Dr.
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Brown, reports his findings: “In the paper, he called Eliot and Sylvia ‘Mr. and Mrs. Z,’
and he called the town of Rosewater ‘Hometown, U.S.A.’ He coined a new word for
Sylvia’s disease, ‘Samaritrophia,’ which he said meant, ‘hysterical indifference to the
troubles of those less fortunate than oneself’” (41). The metaphor, of course, suggests
that Sylvia alone does not suffer from Samaritrophia for, as the narrator explains, “it is
virtually as common among healthy Americans as noses” (43).
Dr. Brown goes on to explain that Samaritrophia is caused by a suppression of the
conscience in those who see that “the outside world has not been even microscopically
improved by the unselfish acts the conscience has demanded” (42). In other words,
Samaritrophia is a sort of dysphoria that results from a seeming ineffectual individual
agency in the face of a large-scale problem like poverty, a similar kind of dysphoria that
Billy experiences as a result of war. For Sylvia, who first tried to be compassionate and
helpful along with Eliot, the struggle of trying to help the poor to no real economic
prevail becomes too much for her. In much the same way that Billy Pilgrim had begun to
find life meaningless and to develop an attitude of indifference supported by the
Tralfamadorian philosophy, Sylvia becomes apathetic to the misfortunes of others. In
light of Slaughterhouse-Five and Breakfast of Champions, it becomes clear that
Samaritrophia is the equivalent response to poverty and a misleading American Dream as
Tralfamadorianism is for Billy a response to the debilitating loss of agency brought on by
war (Ramsey “God” 214). Like Billy, those who suffer from Samaritrophia begin to see
themselves lacking agency because they believe that their efforts are futile. Just as David
Vanderwerken describes Vonnegut’s America as having “adopted the Tralfamadorian
philosophy that justifies apathy” (54), America, for Vonnegut, also seems to have come
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down with a case of Samaritrophia that justifies indifference to the poor and even a belief
that the poor have gotten what they deserve. After all, when Amanita Buntline buys
Caroline Rosewater (Eliot’s distant cousin’s wife) a $17 toilet paper cover and Caroline
tries to deny Amanita’s gift, she states simply that: “People get what they deserve […]
That’s the First Law of Life” (128).
Both Tralfamadorianism and Samaritrophia become manifestations of the internal
conflict that arises in individuals whose personal experiences tell them that they have no
agency. Interestingly, Dr. Brown suggests that Eliot is at risk for coming down with
Samaritrophia but that Eliot will not leave “Hometown, USA” because “His Destination
is there” (45). The idea of a journey or process is implicit in a term like “destination”
because the destination cannot exist if the individual does not engage in some process of
reaching it. This “spinning out” of terms, as Burke would call it, parallels the kind of
ambiguity in the agency-purpose ratio of the pentad. Dr. Brown echoes the sentiment that
Eliot’s purpose and agency both reside in his destination—Rosewater, Indiana.
As a whole, the Rosewater Trilogy reveals the inconsistencies that begin to arise
as real human dramas play out and those human agents seek to understand their own
positions within those dramas. The critique lies within the alliance between Christian
theology and American capitalism where Christianity becomes materialized and
capitalism becomes mystified. For Burke and Vonnegut, pure or essentialist worldviews
are problematic because they suppress dialectical thinking and deny the realities of the
complexity of human conflict. In regard to Rosewater, not only is capitalism actually a
fundamentally material philosophy (not mystic), but it inconsistently becomes dependent
upon an agency-driven philosophy embodied in the concept of the American Dream—
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work hard enough and you will find success—which Eliot takes issue with explicitly later
on. This idea of hard work which is attained through human agency is borrowed from
theological conceptions of human agency. As a result, human agents (Americans in this
case) contradictorily reimagine a scenic philosophy in terms of agency. With Eliot as a
sort of “model citizen” resistant to Samaritrophia, Vonnegut uses him to foil characters
like Senator Rosewater and McAllister who argue that charity not only fails to help the
poor but makes poverty worse for all. Brian McCammack observes that “[f]or Vonnegut,
public political ideology and private religious teaching effectively coalesce into one
social philosophy,” which he suggests blurs the lines between the public and private
spheres (164). This particular melding of public and private philosophies positions
individuals as agents who, alone, truly are no match for the influence of the public
economic philosophy that is simultaneously dependent upon their believing in their own
agency.
An Idealistic Solution to a Material Problem from a Mystic Perspective
Vonnegut, through Eliot and Trout, identifies the basic issue at hand as the fact
that “Americans have long been taught to hate all people who will not or cannot work, to
hate even themselves for that” (184). When Eliot explains to Sylvia why he wants to help
the poor of Rosewater County, he identifies the root of their problem materially, in
relation to labor:
I look at these people, these Americans… and I realize that they can’t even care
about themselves any more--because they have no use. The factory, the farms, the
mines across the river--they’re almost completely automatic now. And America
doesn’t even need these people for war--not any more. Sylvia--I’m going to be an
artist… I’m going to love these discarded Americans, even though they’re useless
and unattractive. That is going to be my work of art. (Rosewater 36)
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Eliot believes that the problem in America is that people are no longer useful. This
particular declaration foreshadows, in a sense, Dwayne Hoover’s “realization” from
reading Trout’s novel that people are machines, a reality that the Tralfamadorians cannot
understand why people would be so offended by. Capitalism depends upon labor
performed by people who, under its system, are just machines of labor. The other anxiety
present in Eliot’s explanation to Sylvia is that industries are “almost completely
automatic now.” Not only are these people only valued for their abilities as machinery,
but they are beginning to be replaced by actual machines. By pointing out this dilemma,
Vonnegut is closely taking issue with how he sees capitalism in particular impacting the
individual when the human’s agency-driven identity begins to lose its value in the
material scene.
Having coming to see the problem of social inequality rooted in the way that
humans have been taught to value one another only for the work that they can do, Eliot
gleans a potential solution to the problem from reading Trout’s fiction. By the time Eliot
ends up in the psychiatric hospital for the second time possibly having fallen victim to
Samaritrophia, he has already been living out Trout’s solution but finds himself unable to
provide an explanation for his behavior. Per Eliot’s behest, Senator Rosewater summons
Trout to explain Eliot’s behavior for a court case that will determine the fate of the
Rosewater fortune. Trout describes Eliot’s social experiment as “probably the most
important [...] of our time,” explaining that: “The problem is this: How to love people
who have no use? [...] if we can’t find reasons and methods for treasuring human beings
because they are human beings, then we might as well, as has so often been suggested,
rub them out” (183-4). Here, Trout echoes what Eliot has already expressed to Sylvia
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about his mission. The solution that Trout and Eliot offer rests upon a humanistic
philosophy that corresponds to agent on the pentad. Based on the Burkeian Grammar,
Eliot and Trout are seeking to privilege agent with this new philosophy by placing value
intrinsically within the individual human, which makes their solution idealistic.
The mystification of capitalism in its alliance with Christianity attaches to it the
same purpose-agency dialectic that is present within mystic philosophies. As noted,
capitalism actually occupies a material space where scene would be the privileged
pentadic term. Evidenced by the Tralfamadorian interest in Charles Darwin and Burke’s
own discussions of scene, one particularly ambiguous pairing within a materialist
philosophy is the scene-agent ratio. This ambiguity can be seen in a concept like survival
of the fittest, which is the reason for the Tralfamadorian interest in Darwin rather than
Jesus Christ. Within the survival of the fittest worldview, an agent who is “fittest”
inherently possesses the traits that allow his or her survival within the corresponding
material scene. Though agent and scene can never be synonymous, the underpinning of
this kind of philosophy illustrates how materialism still holds within it this need for the
fittest agent in spite of its claim to scene.
In addition, by emphasizing the substance of the agent in this way, agential
control over being the fittest is ruled out and agency is deemphasized. The result of
mystifying a material system like capitalism is that when its unnatural dependence upon
agency reveals itself through the failure of a promise like the American Dream, those
who remain most “fit” are forced to reveal the true nature of that material dialectic by
explaining away the result with a worldview that would be labeled Social Darwinism.
Vonnegut reveals this contradiction by pitting Eliot against his father and others like
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McAllister who express survival of the fittest worldviews. The interesting point about
this is that it isn’t mystic philosophies that necessarily deny free-will but materialist ones.
With the alliance between material capitalism and mystic Christianity, the agents
themselves can begin to not only mysticize capital but materialize their religious beliefs
with claims that God has willed some agents to be more fit than others, which is what
Vonnegut reveals in the characters who foil Eliot. In order to overcome this material
problem, Eliot sees it as his purpose to offer up an idealistic solution that places value
intrinsically within the human agent. From his own mystic worldview, Eliot takes the
scene-agent ratio of materialism and reimagines it as pure idealism by focusing solely on
the human agent.
Unjust treatment of the poor manifested by the alliance of economic and
theological belief systems in America is Vonnegut’s primary societal critique, but it
extends into the issue of social equality at large evidenced by the emphasis on a new
humanistic philosophy. In Vonnegut’s world, the mystic quality of Christianity is
borrowed by capitalism in order to account for an unjust social order. In his discussion of
Billy Pilgrim, Richard Hinchcliffe argues that there is a “discrepancy between the
Christian message of love and the intolerance and violence that religion advances to
protect its belief systems,” and Vonnegut’s texts “knowingly [play] on the hypocrisy”
(192). The humanistic teachings of Jesus Christ are fundamentally incompatible with the
kind of attitude toward people that Social Darwinism sanctions. Thurmond McAllister,
one of the lawyers in charge of the Rosewater Foundation’s affairs, mocks the emergence
of this kind of humanism from young, wealthy men (like Eliot) who want to share their
fortunes with the poor:
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Every year at least one young man whose affairs we manage comes into our
office, wants to give his money away […] He has learned of the great crimes that
are at the roots of so many family fortunes. He has had his Christian nose rubbed,
often for the very first time, in the Sermon on the Mount” (120).
McAllister acknowledges that this impetus for a newfound humanism often stems from a
reintroduction to Christian teaching. Unlike Eliot, however, McAllister cannot accept
that, as Robert Morace puts it, “unlimited wealth was the fly in the ointment of an
America disabled by pathological self-reliance and ‘samaritrophia’” (152). Morace may
be right in his analysis, but McAllister sees an obstacle too great for one man’s wealth to
overcome saying, “How dare a university teach compassion without teaching history,
too?” (Rosewater 120). According to McAllister, history teaches one thing: “Giving away
a fortune is a futile and destructive thing. It makes whiners of the poor, without making
them rich or even comfortable. And the donor and his descendants become
undistinguished members of the whining poor” (120). McAllister is certainly no friend to
the poor, but he does recognize that redistributing one man’s fortune back into the system
that created it equally fails to address the substance of wealth inequality in particular. On
Burkeian terms, characters like his father and McAllister are materialists, while Eliot’s
emphasis on human agents makes him an idealist.
Though his idealism has already been made apparent in his claims about loving
people simply because they are human, Eliot’s interest in justice extends that connection
to idealism on explicitly Burkeian terms. When Senator Rosewater asks Eliot if he is a
communist, he responds:
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Oh, I have what a lot of people would probably call communistic thoughts [...]
but, for heaven’s sakes, Father, nobody can work with the poor and not fall over
Karl Marx from time to time--or just fall over the Bible, as far as that goes. I think
it’s terrible the way people don’t share things in this country. I think it’s a
heartless government that will let one baby be born owning a big piece of the
country, the way I was born, and let another baby be born without owning
anything. The least a government could do, it seems to me, is to divide things up
fairly among the babies. Life is hard enough, without people having to worry
themselves sick about money, too. There’s plenty for everybody in this country, if
we’ll only share more. (Rosewater 87-8)
Eliot’s idea of justice is tied explicitly to wealth equality. In A Grammar of Motives,
Burke attributes the concept of a unified State as just to Plato who, in his Republic, was
combatting the Sophists who “observed that there was a different justice for the rich than
for the poor” (173). Burke explains that Plato “sought for a ‘higher’ concept of justice, an
‘ideal’ justice that could be conceived as transcending all these different justices” (173).
Eliot seems to be in search of a similar concept of what is just, and Burke recognizes that
justice in this sense is often written into law but also deeply tied to the material.
Ironically, Eliot pinpoints the source of wealth inequality in his own America as a
mistake that was made by the founding fathers saying that those “ancestors had not made
it the law of the Utopia that the wealth of each citizen should be limited” (Rosewater 12).
Just as Kevin Kruse identifies the alliance between capitalism and Christianity to
have begun in the 1930s with the Spiritual Mobilization movement, Eliot presents a
similar (although fictional) history that links religion to the interests of capital. He reports
that his grandfather, Samuel Rosewater, bought newspapers and preachers to “teach a
simple lesson,” which was that “Anybody who thought that the United States was
supposed to be a Utopia was a piggy, lazy, God-damned fool” (12). However brief, Eliot
recognizes that preachers, in addition to news outlets, played some role in the
mystification of capital because Samuel, who “thundered that no American factory
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worker was worth more than eighty cents a day”, had garnered preachers to support his
ideas. Additionally, in an oath that echoes the sentiments of Billy Pilgrim’s serenity
prayer, Selena, an African-American orphan and servant of the Buntlines, is knowingly
forced to accept her subjugation:
I do solemnly swear that I will respect the sacred private property of others and
that I will be content with whatever station in life God Almighty may assign me
to. I will be grateful to those who employ me, and will never complain about
wages and hours, but will ask myself instead, “What more can I do for my
employer, my republic, and my God?” I understand that I have not been placed on
this Earth to be happy. I am here to be tested […] If I am to pass the test, I must
always be […] respectful to those whom God has, in His Wisdom, placed above
me. (133-4)
This language advances social inequality as the will of God allowing those in more
privileged positions to deny responsibility for failing to treat all people equally. By
“being content” with the class that God “assigns” to her, Selena must admit that God’s
purpose overcomes her own human agency. There is also a sense that Selena, as Amanita
describes it, has gotten what she deserves, which is a view that places emphasis on the
agent; however, in this case, the insinuation is, of course, that something must be
inherently wrong with the agent to have found him or herself in this lesser class. Selena’s
oath contains both capitalist and Christian overtones that can be seen to implicate the
contradiction in their alliance. The anxieties expressed even within the oath (i.e. that
Selena must vow to never complain about wages and hours) signal that there is something
incompatible about this economic and theological alliance even as it attempts to reaffirm
itself.
Selena’s oath also bears echoes of the problem with the concept of the American
Dream that have only been insinuated thus far. After the Senator questions if Eliot is a
communist, he goes on to claim that “it’s still possible for an American to make a fortune
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on his own” (Rosewater 89). This statement elicits Eliot’s perhaps most impassioned
response of the entire Rosewater Trilogy in which he admits that his father is right as
long as “somebody tells him when he’s young enough that there is a Money River, that
there’s nothing fair about it, that he had damn well better forget about hard work and the
merit system and honesty and all that crap, and get to where the river is” (89). For Eliot,
the promises of hard work and the merit system are fundamentally incompatible
conceptions of human agency under a philosophy that is actually inherently material.
Paul Ramsey, in his discussion about learning civics from Vonnegut, brings up an
important point that Vonnegut makes in his final book, A Man Without a Country, which
is that “Christianity and Socialism alike, in fact, prescribe a society dedicated to the
proposition that all men, women, and children are created equal and shall not starve” (99;
11). Vonnegut personally was not shy about his socialism, so McCammack’s
characterization of it as “gospel-inspired” is warranted considering the Biblical references
throughout the Rosewater trilogy. McCammack argues that:
The basis of Vonnegut’s socialism is a concern for the poor and criticism of those
who participate in the system of their exploitation. This type of socialism focuses
on the humanity and basic equality of each and every person, and therefore is
more closely related to Marxist Humanism (a school of thought that emphasizes
human agency) than any strictly traditional or institutional interpretation of
Marxist or socialist doctrine. (162)
Critics like McCammack and David Vanderwerken emphasize that Vonnegut’s socialism
“restores individual agency precluded by Tralfamadorianism” (50). While these critics’
observations do ring true, particularly for Vonnegut himself, one may recall that Eliot
still tends to operate under a mystic worldview with his repeated insistence that “from
somewhere something” was telling him “where to go, what to do there, and why to do it”
(Rosewater 31).
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The Question of Burkeian Transcendence
Although Kathryn Hume argues that, “Vonnegut is not a didactic writer […] He
works with emotions and metaphors, not with logical arguments and instructive
blueprints (221), Vonnegut appears at least didactic enough to teach that “our hatred of
useless human beings and the cruelties we inflict upon them for their own good need not
be parts of human nature” (Rosewater 187). In spite of the effort to live out this idealistic
humanism on Eliot’s part, Hume is correct in her observation that Vonnegut has not left
“instructive blueprints.” The idealism of Eliot’s experiment, one that lands him in the
psychiatric hospital for a second time, is a questionable solution to the inconsistencies
that arise within the alliance between economic and theological belief systems.
Eliot seems to disregard both the Tralfamadorian and Samaritrophic impulses in
those around him even as he seeks to construct a solution that would combat the apathy
that is associated with both. In his discussion of Burke’s notion of transcendence that the
dialectic can provide access to, Zappen characterizes transcendence in this way: “You
might agree with each other if you could see that each of your views is partial and
incomplete without the others—and perhaps even at odds with itself” (281). Vonnegut
could certainly be said to successfully illustrate how these mystic and materialist
philosophies were actually at odds with themselves; but, it is unclear if Eliot’s voice
manages to show how the opposing views, including his own, are “partial and
incomplete” without one another. In fact, Eliot’s philosophy in the end seems as subject
to Vonnegut’s critique as the other worldviews that are critiqued throughout the trilogy.
The notion of the dialectic itself assumes that competing views are necessary and,
in fact, do not truly operate in isolation from one another. Just as agency is implicit in the
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purpose of a mystic philosophy, so the substance of the agent is implicit in a truly
materialist philosophy (like capitalism). Throughout the Rosewater Trilogy, Vonnegut’s
characters are able to reveal the problem that arises for individuals when mystic and
material philosophies begin to influence the human agent’s ability to distinguish between
the two as well as when philosophies are purely reduced. In this case, the result is that
capitalism becomes mystified and Christianity becomes materialized, and this crossing of
philosophical motivations begins to sanction social injustice. Through his satire,
Vonnegut shows how capitalism becomes seen as a divine system in which wealth
inequalities become justified through religious appeals to God. As seen with the many
essentialist claims made by various characters throughout this trilogy, purification of any
pentadic element suppresses the dialectic and cuts off access to the possibility for
transcendence.
Although Vonnegut can be seen to favor Eliot’s ideals in some ways, Eliot’s
humanism purely emphasizes agents and for that reason corresponds to an essentialist
idealism on Burkeian terms. What can never be seen in Eliot’s view is how this valuation
of human agents works within a pentadic ratio or how it reaches a higher level of
generalization that would resolve the preexisting conflicts. Pitting Eliot’s idealistic
humanism against a scenic system like capitalism remains within the dilemma of
seemingly irreconcilable perspectives. Although the dialectic ensures that the answer to
one question creates multiple additional questions, the problem with Eliot’s philosophy
achieving transcendence is that it seems to disregard both the scene-agent ratio and the
purpose-agency ratio that the free-will dialectic is born of. This purification of the
humanism that Eliot calls for leaves it, too, within an essentialist bind that suppresses the

73

dialectic. Though some critics have found it reasonable to disregard Eliot’s compromised
ethos in order to capitalize on the idyllic aspect of his philosophy, Vonnegut seems at
least equally skeptical and critical of Eliot at times as he is of his other characters. For
Vonnegut and Burke, it seems, the notion of loving people simply because they are
human would certainly be ideal, but it would not achieve a productive dialecticalrhetorical transcendence.
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CONCLUSION

In spite of their generic differences, Kenneth Burke and Kurt Vonnegut share, on
Burkeian terms, a more pragmatic view of humans as agents who do have and should use
their agency. Both saw and understood the potential that war had for leaving individuals
with a sense of themselves as powerless, and the suppression of the dialectic is certainly
an aspect of that sense. For Burke, this made Dramatism all the more important as a tool
that human agents could use to transcend their conflicts. Thinking the Rosewater Trilogy
in terms of Burke’s Dramatism helps to uncover at least part of what it was that Vonnegut
saw as a fundamental inconsistency in the newfound American values that emerged in the
1930s. While war was its own ongoing issue throughout the mid-twentieth century,
capitalism and Christianity were also significant philosophical motivators of which
Vonnegut was undeniably critical, especially because of their potential for muddying one
another’s fundamental tenants in the minds of Americans. Though Burke’s views are
perhaps more veiled in this regard, his assertions in his exploration of language through
theology certainly indicate a sense of skepticism in regard to inconsistency in
interpretation of religious philosophies.
The critiques levied at Burke by Fredric Jameson (and Robert Wess) remain
warranted in some ways, however, Dramatism still has much to offer critics interested in
understanding the ideological motivations of the characters in a text. Likely to Jameson’s
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chagrin, too, Burke is most useful in this sense to critics who are interested in thinking
about how that ideological analysis is situated historically and contemporarily. In Burke’s
own words, Dramatism allows a critic to “spin out” terminologies in order to understand
where dialectical philosophies intersect and begin to see how what seem like
contradictory worldviews can emerge from within a single character, text, or author.
Burke himself referred to literature as “equipment for living”, so taking Dramatistic
analysis to literature makes it all the more productive as such.
Overall, logology remains a weakness in the Burkeian corpus because of its own
seeming mystic quality; however, there is something to be said for the theorization of
dialectical terms and the analytical framework that Burke provides access to as a result.
Burke had much invested in language as an ultimate explanation for human experience,
and it can be to the extent that humans use language to explain the world to themselves.
However, Wess’ observation of logology as a psychology of the individual subject is a
primary difficulty in relation to historical development. Even so, Burke does
acknowledge the role of material factors in human relations in the conversation between
The Lord and Satan.
At the very least, Vonnegut’s experiment with Eliot illustrates how the individual
is truly not always effectual in the face of deep-seated, public ideological and historical
influence. Though Eliot succeeds to an extent in his own choice to love people simply
because they are human, he also fails to transcend the real problem of the mystification of
capitalism and the materialization of Christianity through their alliance. The hopes for
Eliot’s philosophy to overcome the scene of capital do not seem promising. For this
reason, Vonnegut can help us to see that Jameson certainly is not all wrong in his
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assessment of Burke. In spite of the symbolicity of language and its power in
constructing and communicating worldviews, the material often carries much weight in
the outcomes of history regardless of what we name it.
In spite of The Rhetoric of Religion’s controversial status as the symbolic
counterpart of Burke’s series, traces of what would become logology can be seen
throughout the language of A Grammar and A Rhetoric of Motives. Just as Breakfast of
Champions sheds important light on how Vonnegut might have readers to understand the
satirical depiction of Tralfamadorianism as well as Eliot Rosewater’s idealistic
humanism, Burke’s Rhetoric of Religion provides new ground for scholars to understand
his grammar and rhetoric. Although not exactly the Symbolic of Motives that Burke had
so long prepared scholars for, The Rhetoric of Religion does present logology as the
description of language itself as a symbol system from which motive is ultimately
derived.
Early Burke’s approach to human dramas certainly seems more pragmatic in
relation to logology’s shift into the mystic, but, as I’ve argued, Burke’s own discomfort
with the cycle of order allows it be seen as an observation itself rather than an assertion
of some unalterable historical narrative. Additionally, one might think of logology as the
privileging of purpose in a Burkeian purpose-agency ratio applied to his own thinking,
where the grammar and rhetoric represent the privileging of agency in the Dramatistic
dialectic. After all, Blakesley has written of Burke: “[He] acknowledges that any
terminology is doomed to be self-contradictory in some respects; rather than resign
himself to avoiding contradiction at all costs or adopting a form of pure relativism, he
converts this realization into an asset” (91).
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Vonnegut’s own considerations of what Burke termed logology through the
Tralfamadorians in Slaughterhouse-Five and the Biblical allusions of Breakfast of
Champions can help scholars to see Burke’s logology as a description of the patterns he
had noted, as Maddux has suggested, rather than a proscription of the way things had to
be. In the “Epilogue: Prologue in Heaven”, Burke finds the ultimate formal, logological
symmetry in his own mapping of the pentad onto the The Word, which can become
questionable in its own seeming status as the ultimate transcendence. Even so, the
fundamental reality of the dialectic remains and, as Burke would and does add
concerning this seemingly ultimate logological transcendence, “it’s more complicated
than that.”
Although it seems unlikely that Eliot’s inclination to love people simply because
they are human held the potential to right all of the wrongs that both Burke and Vonnegut
saw in their world, Charles Berryman describes the spirit of the Rosewater Trilogy best
when he writes that “Vonnegut’s characters know that the fallen world cannot suddenly
be converted back into the lost paradise, but that does not stop them from trying” (101).
Perhaps this is true given the sense in the “Epilogue: Prologue in Heaven” that the
symbol-using animal continues to use language to answer questions about matters
fundamentally unearthly. After all, each new transcendence of a dialectic will offer its
own contradictions and conflicts to overcome, yet Burke remained confident that
Dramatistic approaches to human conflict would yield the most desirable outcomes.
Vonnegut seems to reach for the kind of “revised theology of radical justice and
liberation” that Maddux so argues that logology needs and that, I think, has existed within
it all along (226). For this reason, Burke and Vonnegut together leave us with an image of
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human beings as “active social agents” who can and should “work to bring about social
change in their own settings” (226) even when the task may be impossible.
While reading Burke and Vonnegut alongside one another has proven to be a
fruitful endeavor, much has been left unsaid and untouched in terms of the relationship
between their bodies of work as well as in regard to what Burke can still offer literary
criticism. For Vonnegut, there remains much to be said for his own “theorizations” about
language and human conflict. For Burke, his theories maintain a rich repository for
scholars who are interested in bringing more traditionally rhetorical lenses to literary
analysis. Though literary scholars may find themselves resistant to notions of Burke in
their work, Dramatism and the pentad—as a framework which describes how individuals
are already interpreting human drama, whether textual or not—promise rewarding
insights for scholars interested in further pursuing rhetorical approaches to literature.
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